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The size and geographical position make Russia a link between Europe and 
Asia. Based on her contribution to world culture and interfaith dialogue, history, 
the unique experience of building various economic structures, and the status of a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, she wants to play a constructive 
unifying role in Eurasia. The sources of its philosophical, political and cultural 
justification can be found in the positive part of the ideologies of classical and 
modern Eurasianism. In order for Moscow to take it upon itself, as the leaders of 
the Russian expert community substantiate, the necessary prerequisites have arisen. 
Centripetal trends prevailed everywhere. The era of individualism and isolation is 
passing. The craving for integration and regionalization is growing. Supporting 
international organizations have been created with the participation of Russia, 
China, India and Kazakhstan. They add in influence. The cooperation of the 
participating countries paves the way for the implementation of the Greater Eurasia 
project. 
 The approach that has been chosen for the nascent integration processes is 
healthy conservatism; in this case, it means cooperation while respecting the rule 
of law and what the states agreed upon, creating a modern world order, it is upheld 
by Russia, China, and other BRICS participants. They proceed from the fact that 
the Charter of the World Security Organization, which sanctifies non-interference 
in internal affairs and the sovereign equality of states, must be strictly observed. 
Actions bypassing the UN Security Council are unacceptable. Any coercive 
measures can be introduced only on the basis of its decisions. Nobody should 
encroach on the right of peoples to determine the trajectory of their movement 
towards freedom and a fair government. To sacrifice their destinies, to abstract 
speculative ideals is criminal and impermissible. Russia is guided by this approach, 
building its development assistance policy. It is the basis of the Eurasian 
geopolitical project. 
Only an unconditional positive balance could encourage the founding 
countries to create a Customs Union and Common Economic Space, and then force 
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their transformation into the EAEU. As soon as possible, the EAEU and the 
member states concluded a pioneer agreement on a free trade zone with Vietnam, 
the most dynamically developing country in Southeast Asia. And this construct 
was built despite the economic downturn in Russia and the ongoing sanctions war. 
Naturally, idealizing cooperation within the EAEU is not the goal of this 
work. Obviously, when launching a new large-scale integration project, a large 
number of structural problems have to be overcome. They are connected with the 
already deep-rooted habit of primarily focusing on the promotion of own national 
interests, the different state and level of development of economic mechanisms, 
and intense competition between various groups of lobbyists. They are overlaid 
with another set of problems: instability of national currencies, falling prices for 
goods and services of traditional exports, market volatility, deterioration of 
relations with external partners, etc. However, the point is not the severity of 
individual problems, but the participants' systematic assessment of the overall 
balance of pros and cons. 
Since the time of the 1990s, the leadership of Kazakhstan has become the 
most authoritative lobbyist of the economic union between the countries that 
emerged on the territory of the former USSR. The leading and most authoritative 
theorist of the inevitability of integration in the vastness of Eurasia was the 
President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. He has built the bridge between 
classical Eurasianism and modernity. He took from Eurasianism the tremendous 
positive political charge contained in it. He did a lot to understand how closely the 
peoples of Eurasia are interconnected. He substantiated that their rapprochement 
and integration within the framework of a common integration project is objective. 
He proposed a concrete vision of how it should be implemented [45]. 
However, until the beginning of the 2010s, the prerequisites necessary for 
the success of an ambitious Eurasian project were absent. Centrifugal tendencies 
dominated the former USSR. Even the Union State created by Russia and Belarus 
remained for them mainly on paper. The Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) provided, rather, a “civilized divorce” of parts of the once united country, 
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rather than deepening cooperation between them. According to a wide circle of 
researchers, such an image best describes the situation prevailing at that time. It is 
resorted to, among other things, by Corey Welt and Henry Hale of George 
Washington University in the preface to one of the most systematic recent work on 
the challenges that Eurasia is facing [11]. They write: the CIS “served as a more 
stringent divorce mechanism than the basis for new forms of integration” [11]. 
Departing from classical forms of Eurasian integration the Russian political, 
entrepreneurial and intellectual elite started to look from a multipolar viewpoint of 
the world. It began to build equal, close, friendly relations with the leading rising 
powers of the planet and the corresponding regions - China, India, Brazil, South 
Africa. Russia relied on coordinating its conditions with them with regard to 
economic construction and foreign policy. Thus, the Russian-Chinese-Indian 
consultative mechanism and the BRICS were born. 
From an abstract conjuncture scheme invented by scientists, BRICS has 
become one of the supporting international structures of the modern world, which 
has a growing influence on global processes. Within its framework, dozens of 
dialogues have been established at all levels, including regular meetings of 
industry ministers. Opportunities are widely used for consultations and 
reconciliations on the eve of and on the sidelines of international forums and 
meetings of bodies of international organizations of a wide composition. BRICS is 
especially active in the financial field. The BRICS summits give a great impetus to 
coordinating positions on key issues on the world agenda and building up practical 
cooperation.  
SCO is another supporting organization, on which not only its members, but 
also neighboring countries have high hopes. One of the most important topics 
within is to combine the large-scale Chinese program for the economic revival of 
the Silk Road and the activities of the EAEU. Chinese commentators wrote about it 
as shaping a new reality in Asia [64]. It was rated as a breakthrough by the Russian 
expert community. In their opinion, it creates a political basis for the integration of 
integrations across Eurasia [86].  
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The unification of the potentials of China and the EAEU for the 
implementation of large projects has a great future. Now the economic centers of 
attraction for Asian countries are the second and third economies of the world - 
China and Japan. If the current trends of the fast and dynamic formation of the 
EAEU continue, the new integration association will most likely join them. 
In order to reinforce positive role that it could play in Eurasia Russia is 
ready to actively contribute to pooling efforts not only in the economic field, but 
also in soft and hard security. This is a joint fight against drug trafficking, 
organized crime, smuggling of migrants and refugees, money laundering. One of 
the initiatives also includes the formation and strengthening of an anti-terrorist 
front. The creation of a full-fledged collective security system is an end goal, one 
of the guarantors of which Russia could become. 
Another extremely important resource that Russia could share with the 
countries and peoples of the superregion is energy. In this area, Moscow is a 
recognized leader. A large-scale construction of the most advanced nuclear power 
plants and a stable supply of hydrocarbons - this is what everyone needs. Taking 
into account the acuteness of the problem of energy security, the influence of 
Russia, which has huge oil and gas reserves [20] and built infrastructure of energy 
supplies, in this sector becomes obvious. Impact of Russian gas and oil projects in 
the region on the Greater Eurasia is the central focus of the study. At the moment 
this topic is not researched enough. As Alexey Masterpanov, academician of the 
Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, head of the Analytical Center for Energy 
Policy and Security of the Institute of Oil and Gas Problems of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, member of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Energy 
Strategy, notes on the current most influential work in the field of Greater Eurasia 
studies, the report of the Valdai International Discussion Club “Towards the Great 
Ocean - 5: From Turn to the East to Greater Eurasia”, “While supporting in general 
the idea of Greater Eurasia and agreeing with the proposed principles, goals and 
objectives of its formation, it should, however, be said that one of the most 
important problems of our time - the problem of ensuring energy security - has 
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remained outside of their framework.” [41] This empty tile has to be filled, 
however the research does pretend to completely cover the whole section, as there 
are a lot of themes that could potentially be discussed. Instead it concentrates on 
the “Russia’s play in this game”, building up a research base for the further 
development of the Greater Eurasia studies in this field. For the purpose of this 
research it was chosen to identify Greater Eurasian Partnership as Greater Eurasia 
and do not go into deep analysis of integration processes of organizations and 
initiatives within the framework as it is a topic that could possibly distract the work 
from its focus and most likely both would stay not covered enough being limited 
by the volume of the paper. 
Novelty of the study is in the approach that was taken. Of course, there are a 
lot of respectable studies on Russian energy politics. The latest paper that was 
found during literature revision is “Russia’s Energy Politics and Its Relevance for 
the European Union” by Mark Pierini [72], a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, 
which focus was mainly, on the EU-Russian partnership and points of pressure in 
this industry. Other sources were rather outdated and did not cover the current state 
of affairs in the topic [16] [68]. The research takes out the Russian oil and gas 
exports from the common economic and classical political framework of the 
pressure instrument and puts it into the comparably new Greater Eurasia one as a 
bridge for cooperation. 
The significance of the research is in its potentiality to become first in the 
chain for Greater Eurasian studies and create a basis for further developments in 
this direction of thinking through works of scholars which will take this paper as a 
start point of their own research. Greater Eurasia project needs as many 
background scientific works as possible at the current state. This one provides the 
analysis of a portion of Greater Eurasia energy security issue – the Russian gas and 
oil projects and their impact on the idea. 
The problem of the study: what role does Russian oil and gas companies’ 
projects play in the implantation of the idea of Greater Eurasia?  
8 
 
The goal of the study is to identify the possible influence of Russian 
hydrocarbon exporting firms’ projects (specifying: oil and gas only) on the Greater 
Eurasia venture. 
To achieve the set goal it is necessary to complete a number of objectives: 
1. To conduct an analysis of the frame where the research is put – Greater 
Eurasia concept. 
2. To highlight the potential projects-influencers within the set framework. 
3. To analyze the possibility of impact on the feasibility of the Greater 
Eurasia concept. 
The object of the study is the projects of Russian oil and gas companies 
within Greater Eurasian Partnership frame.  
The subject of the study is the impact that Russian oil and gas companies 
have on the feasibility of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. 
Research hypothesis – the success or fail of Russian oil and gas companies’ 
have direct effect on the implementation of Greater Eurasia concept. 
  The study on the Greater Eurasia is based of works of a great amount of 
authors both Russian and foreign to not fall into idealization of the concept from 
one side and baseless critique from another. Especially valuable for the research 
were works of Russian authors: S. Karaganov, A. Masterpanov, Yu. Shafranik, T. 
Bordachev, D. Trenin, S. Luzyanin and A. Lukin.   
The works of foreign authors brought new interesting perspectives on the 
researched topics. Particularly insightful were papers of B. Maçães, M. 
Kaczmarski, Cl. Mandil and B.Lo. 
The included in the study statistical data which helped to highlight certain 
aspects of the world gas and oil trade tendencies was provided by the reports of 
BP, EIA and OPEC. 
For the purpose of research various data from electronic sources was used. 
Main sources of information on gas and oil projects are official webpages of 
Gazprom and Transneft. Online news sources, such as RIA, RG and Regnum 
helped to enrich the research with fresh facts. 
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The theoretical basis of the research was the works and concepts formed in 
the works of domestic and foreign researchers and devoted to the ideas of Greater 
Eurasia. 
The methodology that was used in the study includes scientific abstraction, 







Chapter 1. Greater Eurasia concept  
The last three or four years have become a time of unprecedented surge in 
interest in Eurasian issues. The Russian initiative to create Greater Eurasia 
Partnership or Greater Eurasia, which is seen as the main conceptual framework 
for promoting various cooperation projects in the region, is often criticized for the 
lack of concrete content for its implementation. Given the growing number of 
regional initiatives, including those from China and India, Russia needs not only to 
formulate an attractive idea, but also to show its relevance and effectiveness. 
The concept of Greater Eurasia, despite the lack of objective historical 
conditions for its implementation, can become a rational practical embodiment of a 
wide range of development and security priorities for a wide group of countries in 
the region. The concept’s problem is the lack of objective historical prerequisites 
for the creation of Greater Eurasia in the presence of a wide range of subjective 
reasons. At the beginning of the chapter, the prerequisites for the emergence of 
Greater Eurasia are analyzed, as well as various ways of perceiving and political 
interpretation of the Eurasian space. For historical reasons, projects for the 
consolidation of Eurasia mainly remained on paper, but current regional and global 
trends create suitable conditions for their implementation in practice. 
The study analyzes the content of Eurasian integration and possible formats 
of cooperation. Particular emphasis is placed on security issues, economic 
cooperation, as well as the development of institutions in the Eurasian space. 
Special attention is paid to relations with potential participants in Greater Eurasia 
(including European countries) and non-regional actors, as well as to the use of 
European integration experience for the development of the Eurasian space. The 
necessity of greater attention to the issue of state sovereignty during cooperation 
within the EAEU (similar to the European experience of representatives and expert 
groups), as well as strengthening the institutional capacity of the EAEU, is 
emphasized. Particular attention is paid to the challenges and barriers to 




1. Defining the concept of Greater Eurasia 
The Polish researcher Marcin Kaczmarski says that “Russia lacks a clear vision 
for ‘Greater Eurasia’, which remains a vague and loosely defined concept.”[15, p. 
1373] Trying to understand this poses several problems first of which is the large 
amount of possible definitions and understanding of the term. Does it bring the 
meaning of primarily a geographical construct or economic framework, 
geopolitical mechanism or the concept for the new world order? Also there is a 
problem in distinguishing (or not connecting to) the concept of Greater Eurasia 
from existing Russian foreign policy ventures (Eurasian Economic Union, “Turn to 
the East”) 
In some aspects Greater Eurasia is an improved or expanded version of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. President Putin hinted towards this when he officially 
presented the idea of Greater Eurasian at the 2016 St. Petersburg Economic Forum: 
Our partners and we think that the [Eurasian Economic Union] can become one of 
the centers of a greater emergent integration area … Now we propose considering 
the prospects for a more extensive Eurasian partnership involving the [EEU] and 
countries in which we already have close partnership—China, India, Pakistan and 
Iran—and certainly our CIS partners...” [29] 
Unsurprisingly, the launch of Putin’s Greater Eurasia venture was not filled 
with details. Subsequent explanations, unfortunately, did not bring clarity and, in 
fact, brought more confusion. Some commentators believe that the main goal of 
Greater Eurasia is essentially regional: to give new life to the flagging EEU [42] 
and position it as "the central unifying structure in the regional Eurasian integration 
network." [88] Such views are shared by Chinese scholars who view Greater 
Eurasia and the EAEU as a “logical continuation of the Soviet past of Russia” and 
as a clear geopolitical initiative aimed at “restoring the leading role of Russia [in 
Eurasia] as to how it was in [the] time of the USSR.” [40] But for other observers, 
the scope of Greater Eurasia is more global than regional. Dmitry Trenin, director 
of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes about “the self-image of a lone, great 
power in a global world; outreach to Asian partners to create a continental order 
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free from the dominance of the United States; and calculated patience toward 
Western Europe.” [49] 
Most importantly, the concept of Greater Eurasia is identified with ambitious 
global governance plans, as stated in the 2017 Valdai Club report, “Toward the 
Great Ocean—5: From The Turn to the East to Greater Eurasia”. This report, 
compiled under the leadership of Sergey Karaganov, speaks of “Eurasia’s 
transformation into a world economic and political center”, with a prospective 
membership encompassing “East, Southeast and South Asian countries, central 
Eurasian countries, Russia, and …increasingly countries in the European 
subcontinent and their associations.” [81, pp. 24-25] 
The project of Greater Eurasia has also become synonymous with Moscow’s 
Turn to the East. Both initiatives are aimed at shifting Russia's foreign policy from 
its traditional Westerncentrism to closer interaction with Asia. Both challenge the 
primacy of a liberal world order. Both include a vision of Russia as an independent 
center of world power. And both projects are focused on Sino-Russian partnership.  
In principle, the Turn to the East is more oriented to the Asia-Pacific region, 
while Greater Eurasia is primarily oriented to the post-Soviet space. But this 
difference has become blurred. China's expansion into Eurasia under the auspices 
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); emphasis in Moscow on aspects of global 
governance of Greater Eurasia concept; and the definition of the United States 
stating that the differences between the two concepts are more theoretical than 
substantive.   
Greater Eurasia, therefore, is at once a regional, extra-regional and global 
project. It is regional in the sense that it is a means of promoting Russian interests 
and influence throughout the post-Soviet space. This is an extra-regional project in 
the aspirations towards the Asia-Pacific region, South Asia and Europe. And it is 
global in that it envisages a recasting of the world order, from one dominated by 
the United States, to one in which Russia is a pivotal player—literally so since a 




2. Predecessors and prerequisites to Greater Eurasia 
In addition to strategic foreign policy advantages, Russia’s turn to the East, 
conceived in the second half of the 2000s in response to the rise of Asia, makes it 
possible to “transform the Trans-Urals, the Far East from a predominantly imperial 
burden — or the rear in confrontation with the West, sometimes the front in rivalry 
with Japan or China — into a potential development area for the whole country” 
[83]. It received an additional impetus due to the conflict with the West and 
successfully coincided with the new geo-economic initiatives of China [4, pp. 573–
589], which proposed in 2013 a large-scale plan of cooperation under the flag of 
the revival of the Great Silk Road. The idea of connecting Europe and Asia by land 
routes, using the historical connotation with the Silk Road [10], gives the Chinese 
initiative a special tone, positioning China as a proactive player whose initiatives 
are aimed at positive changes in the region, and also indicates its desire to combine 
participation in initiative with national development priorities. The Chinese 
initiative, combining the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st Century 
Sea Silk Road, the practical implementation of which since 2013 remains the 
subject of wide discussion not only within the China, but also beyond its borders, 
gradually began to take on a sharper outline. The institutional base was laid down 
for the project: in December 2014, the Silk Road Fund ($ 40 billion) was launched, 
in December 2015 - the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with a capital of $ 
100 billion. In May 2017, the first forum “One Belt, One Way” was held, which 
was attended by the heads of 29 states from Asia, Europe, Latin America (a total of 
about 100 countries were represented) [58]. In this sense, a positive perception of 
this initiative of Greater Eurasia in China facilitates further collaboration in the 
region. At the moment, the Russian turn to the East is developing in the framework 
of the Eurasian direction of the country's foreign policy. The Eurasian theme is 
present in all international forums and is a mandatory part of public speaking. It is 
noteworthy that the growing interest in this topic can be observed not only among 
Russian authors (in particular, on the example of B. Maçães’s reflections on the 
possibility of the formation of a Eurasian supercontinent [9]). Politically, the 
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evolution of the Eurasian concept, for Russia in the first place, has gone from the 
humble idea of pairing the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic 
Belt (2015) to the much larger strategy of the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) 
[84]. Other countries in the region, including Kazakhstan’s homeland of modern 
Eurasianism, are trying to single out precisely the pragmatic aspects of regional 
cooperation. 
Moreover, the word “Russia” is the key word in the phrase “Russia's turn to 
the East” [89]. The growing attention of Russia to the eastern direction of its 
foreign policy is a logical consequence of a shift in the balance of power in the 
Asia-Pacific region and increase in its economic and political significance on a 
global scale. 
Russia has already begun to take advantage of the rise of Asia to balance the 
imbalance in favor of the long prevailing Western vector of foreign policy. So, 
A.S. Galushka noted that 26% of all came to Russia in 2017 Foreign investments 
were directed to the Far East: “The Far East as a whole showed an increase in 
investment of more than 17% in 2017, which amounted to 117.1%, when the 
average for Russia this indicator was 104.4%. In the Far East - the best indicator in 
the country. Moreover, of the 17% growth, more than half were investments by 
residents of the territories of advanced development and the free port, including 
foreign ones ”[24]. More and more attention is being paid to building constructive 
relations with partners in Eurasia. The EAEU is the most important part of the 
Eurasian strategy of Russia. Recently, the ECE has developed a system of 
indicators showing the level of integration and also taking into account the UN 
SDG indicators. According to studies, the level of integration in the EAEU is 
second only to the EU, ahead of, in particular, MERCOSUR and ASEAN, whose 
history has more than 30 and 50 years, respectively. At the same time, the EAEU is 
not confined to itself, on the contrary, it seeks to build interaction with foreign 
states (among potential partners are Singapore, Iran, India, the Republic of Korea, 
Egypt, Israel, Serbia, etc.). In this sense, the experience of concluding the EAEU 
FTA with Vietnam reflects Russia's desire to diversify cooperation with Asian 
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partners. Despite the shortcomings, one can note the positive dynamics of trade: 
the trade between the EAEU countries and Vietnam since the agreement came into 
force - from October 2016 to June 2017 - increased by 11.8% compared to the 
same period in 2015-2016. [75]. In accordance with the agreement, states are 
obligated to reduce customs duties by 88% of goods; 59% of them were reduced 
immediately, the rest in 5–10 years. 
Despite certain successes, Russia's turn to the East in the international 
community is still perceived ambiguously. In particular, J. Spanger notes that 
“with a delay of three years, Moscow followed Washington’s example and now“ 
steers ”towards Asia, but in fact towards China” [62]. At the same time, China is 
turning to the West [62]. The Russian initiative to create Greater Eurasia, which is 
seen as the main conceptual framework for promoting various cooperation projects 
in the region, is often criticized for the lack of specific content or a “roadmap” for 
its implementation: “Almost two years after the first reports about it in public 
space there was no program document or public speech at any high level, which 
would describe the specific content or at least the clear format of this new big idea” 
[43]. Thus, the concept of Greater Eurasia, despite the lack of objective historical 
conditions for its implementation, can become a rational practical embodiment of a 
wide range of development and security priorities for a wide group of countries in 
the region. The research problem is the lack of objective historical prerequisites for 
the creation of Greater Eurasia in the presence of a wide range of subjective 
reasons. The hypothesis of the study is that the concept of Greater Eurasia can be 
considered as a consolidating form of the new global strategy of Russia, on the 
basis of which the most important foreign policy priorities are determined. 
In this regard, in this study it seems necessary to conduct a comprehensive 
analysis of the initiative to create Greater Eurasia, as well as possible formats for 
its further development (including taking into account the analysis of the EU 
experience as a case study). 
In the context of the crisis of the Western model of the world, a number of 
non-Western centers of power offer their vision of a regional and international 
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order. The Chinese Belt and road initiative is valuable not only for the possibility 
of implementing specific projects, but also for its conceptual design (a historical 
link and a single framework for implementing regional initiatives). India, in turn, 
began to actively promote the concept of development of the Indo-Pacific region. 
Political regional initiatives also include the EAEU, the ASEAN General 
Interconnection and Exchange Program, the Steppe Route of Mongolia, the Bright 
Path of Kazakhstan, the Central Corridor of Turkey, the Amber Route of Poland, 
UK Northern Powerhouse, etc.  
Such a wide variety of regional development programs, on the one hand, 
fills the gap in the global vacuum of ideas in the context of the crisis of the 
Western development model. At the same time, this process aggravates 
competition between various regional actors and actualizes the question of the 
future model of the world, the formats of interaction and the coexistence of various 
approaches to maintaining international stability. The development of the idea of 
Greater Eurasia is closely related to the described processes. Russian political 
exaltation around Eurasian themes is natural and explicable. It is seen by many as a 
manifestation of an attempt to break out of the historically established doom of the 
endless choice between Europe and “non-Europe,” respectively, the idea of Greater 
Eurasia is perceived as a kind of reincarnation of Greater Europe [87, pp. 61–63].  
In addition, the states of Eurasia (and Russia is no exception) remain 
extremely susceptible to narratives introduced from outside [54, p. 191–199], often 
based on fairly pragmatic considerations and in search of a national good, but 
forgetting that due to the objective laws of international politics, for any extra-
regional player, the fate of distant states is only a way to achieve their own national 
interests. Therefore, the Eurasian narrative is now perhaps one of the most “trashy” 
of ideas and geopolitical constructions introduced from outside. 
The Greater Eurasian continent has always remained a concept, rather 
metaphysical than political or economic. The blurring of physical boundaries has 
historically been accompanied by the blurring of conceptual boundaries - the 
inability to define Eurasia as a unit on the political mental map. This is the most 
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important component of the “Eurasian curse” - the region’s inability to 
comprehend itself in the categories of common values, cooperation, and the 
common good and, as a result, to identify itself as an integral element of the 
world’s structure. 
3. The agendas of Greater Eurasia 
3.1 Economic sphere 
At the most specific level, the Greater Eurasia venture is called upon to 
assist the diversification of Russia's foreign trade. This entails entry into Asian 
markets in areas where Russia has comparative advantages: weapons, energy and 
infrastructure, nuclear technology, food and water security. Moscow's logic is 
simple: most Asian economies are still developing, and Russia has the goods and 
services that they need. Such complementarity is not only mutually beneficial, but 
also potentially short-lived, given the rapid growth rates of many Asian economies. 
There are also additional benefits. If Russia can open up new markets, it will be 
less dependent on its traditional European trading partners and, therefore, will have 
a stronger negotiating position with them on a number of issues, both political and 
economic. Among other benefits, this will reinforce the idea that Western sanctions 
are no longer suitable for this purpose. [5, p. 35] 
Moscow views Greater Eurasia as a means of positioning Russia in the 
center, or at least in the main direction, of expanding trade routes between Europe 
and Asia. Given how quickly BRI unfolds, it makes sense to connect Russia to this 
movement. This increases the chances of attracting significant direct investment 
for large projects such as Yamal LNG, in which the Beijing Silk Road Fund 
bought a 9.9% stake. Moscow is also interested in the main Eurasian transport 
routes passing through Russia, so that it is not marginalized as the BRI spreads. 
The promotion of Greater Eurasia is an attempt to seize the initiative, rather than 
remain a mere spectator of Chinese projects. 
All this raises the question of Greater Eurasia as a geo-economic "space", an 
idea that borrows from the "common spaces" of the EU. Although Greater Eurasia 
is much less directive, it nevertheless supports the basic premise of the EU that a 
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single integrated trading space is inherently beneficial, with a multiplier effect for 
the economies of the participating countries. Moscow hopes that existing non-
Western multilateral structures, such as the SCO, BRICS and the EAEU, can unite 
within the framework of Greater Eurasia to create “one powerful economic 
“engine”: an organization with a common economic zone ... a powerful economic 
union without equals in the world." [35] Even if it is a highly optimistic vision 
does not come true, Russia would still have the feeling of being a leading member 
of the “emerging geoeconomic community”, which helps to protect it from the 
effects of globalization under the leadership of the West, and also increases its 
international respectability. [71, p. 4] 
Finally, the vision of Greater Eurasia covers specific regional economic 
goals, such as the development of the Russian Far East (RFE). Moscow's opinion 
here has changed slightly since the 1990s. Today, as then, Russia considers the 
leading Asian economies as potential sources of unforeseen investments, which is 
the key to the revival of the region. And Moscow still believes in Special 
Economic Zones (now called Advanced Special Economic Zones – ASEZs), while 
promoting ambitious development plans. However, the wider context of Russian 
foreign policy has changed. The previous emphasis on cooperation with the West 
has given way to the Turn to the East, Greater Eurasia and the “strategic 
partnership” with China. Moscow believes that the prospects for using the 
economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region are now better than decades ago. 
The annual Eastern Economic Forum (EEF), which Putin has chaired since its 
founding in 2015, reflects this belief. Announcing that the RFE and Eastern Siberia 
are open for business, the Forum declares Moscow's full commitment to enhanced 
cooperation with Asia. [23] 
3.2 The security aspect 
Although comparatively little attention is paid to the development of Greater 
Eurasia as an exercise in the field of strengthening security, it is of particular 
importance for Moscow. This is partly due to concerns about various threats: the 
potential instability of the regime in the former Soviet Central Asia, the growth of 
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Islamic extremism and the consequences for the region as a result of the ongoing 
conflict in Afghanistan. Moscow is also preoccupied with information security 
issues and the hidden threat of mass democratic movements. 
Nevertheless, the true significance of the security aspect in the framework of 
the Greater Eurasia project lies not so much in counteracting specific threats as in 
creating a more general framework - the “rules of the game" - to strengthen 
security. The security sector is that area in relations between Russia and China, 
where Moscow is undoubtedly a leading player and is likely to remain so for 
several more years. This is important not only in itself, but also from the point of 
view of a wider picture of Greater Eurasia and Russian foreign policy. Being able 
to have a title of the primary security provider allows Russia to position itself as an 
independent power, on the same level with China. [5, p. 30] Consequently, much is 
said about the “division of labor”, in which China places emphasis on trade and 
economic development, and Russia cares about security both at its own expense 
and through mechanisms such as the CSTO. The "division of labor" sends a 
message that the Sino-Russian partnership is a mutually beneficial relationship 
between equals, albeit with different advantages, and gives weight to the idea of 
«win-win» relations within Greater Eurasia. 
Moscow is very actively promoting the powers of Russia to ensure local 
security. This greatly expanded the capabilities of the Russian armed forces thanks 
to a comprehensive and sustainable military modernization program. The 
consequences of this were underlined by the success of Russian armed operations 
in Ukraine and the Middle East. Moscow, to the shock and confusion of the West, 
has shown that it is ready and able to use force to achieve its goals. The 
demonstration effect extends to Eurasia. As one commentator said, “Russia's 
contribution to the fight against Islamic terrorist networks and the liberation of 
parts of Syria and Iraq can be seen as a kind of test for the role of sheriff in the 
Greater Eurasia." [50] 
The military potential of Russia was further recognized thanks to its active 
participation in various large-scale exercises: the annual naval operations "Joint 
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Sea" with the Chinese; series “Peace Mission” in the framework of the SCO; and, 
most strikingly, Vostok-2018, the largest Russian teaching in almost four decades. 
[80] Such demonstrations serve several purposes. They reflect the Kremlin’s 
narrative of Russia as a resurgent, confident, and decisive world power. They make 
the West nervous - a reaction that Moscow finds pleasant at a time when relations 
are very difficult. And they remind Russia's neighbors - both large ambitious 
powers such as China and the former Soviet republics - that it still leads Central 
Eurasia when it comes to military power. 
However, Moscow recognizes that playing the role of a major security 
provider cannot rely solely on hard power, but must be complemented by “softer” 
means. Russia stepped up high-level military exchanges with China, increased 
arms sales to Asian markets, and strengthened its base in Central Asia. It also took 
a more flexible approach to organizations such as the SCO. For a long time, 
Moscow was ambivalent towards this organization: on the one hand, hoping that it 
could become counter-NATO; on the other hand, fearing that the Chinese would 
use it as a Trojan horse to expand their influence in Central Asia at the expense of 
Russia. 
Recently, however, it has begun to focuse on how the SCO can be credited 
to serve the Greater Eurasia project. As one of the architects of the latter, Timofei 
Bordachev, notes, “The SCO...is being “reset” as a large-scale Eurasian 
organization focused on macro-regional development, rather than a narrow 
regional organization.” [90] Similarly, scientist Dmitry Efremenko believes that 
"the SCO could act as an incubator for a wide range of agreements and initiatives," 
which over time could form the basis of the "community of Greater Eurasia." 
Although such ideas are still emerging, they nevertheless testify to a more 
confident attitude towards strengthening security in Eurasia and Russia's role in 
this. Whether through projection of hard power, arms sales, defense ties or regional 
multilateralism Greater Eurasia is designed to convey the image of a prosperous 




3.3 The ideological aspect 
It is often claimed that Russian foreign policy is not ideological, but 
“pragmatic.” In fact, this statement does not reflect the state of affairs in this 
particular aspect. Thus, Valdai’s 2017 report “From Turn to the East to Greater 
Eurasia” describes Greater Eurasia as “framework for geopolitical, geoeconomic 
and geoideological thinking”. [5, p. 24] The main author of this report, Sergey 
Karaganov, is even more unequivocal in other places. In an article entitled 
“Russia's Victory, new Concert of Nations,” he quotes Greater Eurasia in support 
of his thesis that “authoritarian countries with their managed incomplete 
democracies can be better prepared to compete and govern in the growingly 
volatile world.” He further claims that “Russia ... has placed itself on the “right 
side of history”, emphasizing not postmodern, but modern or post-post-modern 
values: national sovereignty, freedom of political and cultural choice for all 
countries and peoples, personal and national dignity ...- old human values." [85] 
From this point of view, Greater Eurasia embodies a new ideological 
struggle against Western universalism and globalization, advocating what has been 
described as “positive authoritarianism”. Ironically, this point of view tends to 
support the fashionable view of the United States on Sino-Russian partnership as 
an authoritarian arrangement aimed at undermining the interests of US and the 
liberal world order. 
Much of the ideology surrounding the concept of Greater Eurasia is more 
presentation than inspirational. This provides the appearance of a cultural-
civilizational unity of what is actually the sum of ideas, few of which were duly 
thought out. But Karaganov’s comments also reflect the deep sentiments of Putin’s 
elite. Many of them consider pragmatic authoritarianism more suitable than 
democracy, taking into account the history of Russia and the “special” 
characteristics. They remain ideologically and geopolitically opposed to the liberal 
world order - the opposition, which finds a natural home in the idealized vision of 
Greater Eurasia with its own norms and values. 
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However, this vision is completely different from the mystical and often 
racist neo-Eurasianism promoted by people like Lev Gumilev (1912-92) and later 
Alexander Dugin. Instead of looking back at the mystical (and mythical) Russian 
past, today's edition of Greater Eurasia is about embodying the emerging post-
Western and post-liberal regulatory consensus. 
3.4 A new world order ambitions 
According to some Russian scientists, Greater Eurasia is the basis of a new 
fairer world orders instead the old almost destroyed one. [82] There is a question 
which follows the Greater Eurasia concept: why would Russia go down this path 
and not rely on the BRICS framework, which already exists more than ten years 
and which Russia has done more than any other side for development? 
On the one hand, the emphasis on Greater Eurasia does not imply a rejection 
of the BRICS. The more non-Western structures and mechanisms there are, the 
higher the chances of building a post-American world order. Greater Eurasia is just 
one of many components of a multidimensional approach to global governance. 
Secondly, the narrower task of Greater Eurasia contributes to a more focused 
and unified approach to global issues. BRICS is a geographically and politically 
fragmented body, a factor that greatly limited its effectiveness, much to Moscow’s 
dismay. For example, India’s presence prevented an agreement on “information 
security” and Internet regulation, and China’s support for Pakistan ensured that 
there was no significant consensus on counter-terrorism. More generally, Sino-
Indian strategic tensions and India’s close ties with US mean that the BRICS will 
not come close to becoming the basis of an alternative world order, as Moscow had 
originally hoped. 
Greater Eurasia is largely free from such restrictions. Focused on Sino-
Russian partnerships, it creates a more convincing impression of a common goal. 
Therefore, it seems to have better prospects than a body whose members have 
completely different points of view and priorities. BRICS cannot have a “geo-
ideological” community as it currently exists, while the developing Greater Eurasia 
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offers at least a sporting chance for some kind of authoritarian consensus. [63, p. 
27] 
4. Challenges on the way of Greater Eurasia 
4.1 Competing interests of state-actors 
“The most significant obstacle to the success of the grandiose project of 
Moscow arises from the different and often competing interests of other actors”. 
[63, p. 29] Although the Russia speaks of rapprochement, Greater Eurasia is a field 
that is more disaggregated than ever.  
China: The Sino-Russian partnership is closer and more significant than 
ever. However, there are areas where the two sides diverge substantially. One of 
them is in their view of the concept of Greater Eurasia and how it should be 
implemented. It is easy enough to agree that Eurasian cooperation is desirable; it is 
much more difficult to establish the basis on which this can be implemented. The 
Chinese view Greater Eurasia primarily as a means of expanding economic ties, 
which is part of their greater commitment to globalization under Chinese 
conditions. Beijing's approach reflects an ambitious and confident worldview. The 
Eurasian continent is an “open” territory, ready for development by any party that 
has the means and the desire to complete the task. In practice, this means the 
dominant role of China as a leading economic power in Eurasia. 
The Kremlin’s agenda is remarkably different from Beijing’s. Moscow is not 
interested in opening Eurasia to other major players, with the exception of very 
narrow and privileged conditions (for example, foreign direct investment in 
Russia). It was hard enough to stop China's economic growth and limit the 
sovereign aspirations of the former Soviet republics. But the emergence of a more 
volatile and competitive strategic environment in Eurasia is one more obstacle for 
Moscow. Instead, its priority is to manage Greater Eurasia in such a way that it 
becomes, if not the exclusive Russian space, then at least at the head and direction 
of Russia and China. That is why the previously mentioned “division of labor” is 
so important. According to such an agreement, Moscow can rationalize China’s 
economic superiority by pretending to be offset by Russia's superiority in regional 
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political and security matters. Such an illusion, however, is unlikely to be 
sustainable if Great Eurasia, however defined, becomes free for all. 
The Beijing Unification Agenda may, in certain circumstances, support 
Russia's interests. In the end, there is a long tradition of turning Russia into an 
economic and civilizational bridge between Europe and Asia. But in reality, 
everything is not so simple. It is important to note that there is no single “Silk 
Road”, but there are several routes, of which the one that passes through Russia 
(the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor) is by no means the most 
important. The danger is that as the Belt and Road Initiative unfolds, Russia may 
become increasingly marginalized, a B-road along the Chinese road to the west. It 
is also doubtful that it would be simple transit country. [51] In general, Russia is 
not ready for an “open liberal trading environment” in Eurasia, as stated in the 
2017 Valdai report. Such a result would be good for Chinese manufacturing 
exporters, but would risk provoking an internal reaction from Russian 
manufacturers trying to counter foreign competition. 
In addition, there is a gap between the ideas of Russia and China about the 
place of Greater Eurasia in global governance. The Kremlin sees in Greater Eurasia 
the basis of an alternative, post-Western international order. Beijing, however, 
seeks to preserve the existing international system in one form or another, even in 
the face of the aggravation of political and trade tensions in relations with US. 
Russian politicians and thinkers emphasize the role of Greater Eurasia in terms of 
global geopolitical shifts, while their Chinese colleagues attach much more 
importance primarily to the economic goals of connecting and developing 
infrastructure. 
These divergences directly affect Sino-Russian cooperation in Eurasia. For 
example, the widely publicized agreement in May 2015 between the EAEU and the 
Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) reached very little, and the Chinese rejected a 
number of project proposals from the EAEU because of commercial insolvency. 
[39] The only signal of success, the Silk Road Fund's purchase of a 9.9 percent 
stake in the Yamal LNG project, had little in common with Greater Eurasia as 
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such. It was an investment designed to strengthen China’s position in the Russian 
energy sector and in the Arctic, as well as secure the support of Putin by 
supporting his closest partners. In other words, it was a two-way, even 
personalized deal, and not a product of a common transcontinental vision. [39] 
Moscow and Beijing did not allow differences in approaches to Greater 
Eurasia to spoil their relationship. As noted by Kaczmarski, the Chinese have 
shown “strategic self-restraint,” demonstrated “respect” for the Kremlin’s idea of 
Greater Eurasia, and expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the Sino-Russian 
partnership is equal. [71, p. 5] But it is evident that can both sides suspend mistrust 
about the erosion of the "division of labor". It is crazy to imagine a continuing 
clear-cut distinction between economic dominance and geopolitical primacy, or a 
future in which Beijing is only concerned with making money, and not with the 
wider consequences of its economic recovery. Until now, Moscow has calmly 
reacted to China’s growing presence in the political and security fields in Eurasia, 
a striking example of which is the four-way mechanism of cooperation and 
coordination with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. But sooner or later China 
will move from these humble beginnings to a more ambitious and multifaceted role 
in Eurasian affairs. Russia most likely will not accept the position of passive 
acceptance. 
It is significant that amid the public warmth of the Sino-Russian partnership, 
the establishment in Moscow, however, is worried about the future. Karaganov 
warns of the consequences of losing momentum in the Greater Eurasian Project: 
“Beijing is moving towards creating a Sinocentric system in Asia. We risk 
remaining on the periphery, albeit friendly, unless we propose our own ideas.” It is 
interesting that he refers to several warnings, referring to the Sino-Russian 
partnership itself: “… if China does not embark on a path of hegemony, inherently 
built into the Middle Kingdom concept, but becomes first among equals in Greater 
Eurasia and immerses itself into its institutions, and remains committed to 
maintaining the state of equilibrium, [Russia and China] will keep up a close 
relationship…” This highly conditional statement reflects the view, more clearly 
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expressed two years earlier, that Russia should act as a “a friendly and constructive 
counterbalance to China to make sure it does not become ‘too strong’ or turn into a 
potential hegemon scaring its neighbors.” [84]  
Other regional powers: China's growing opportunities and ambitions are the 
biggest challenge in the Kremlin vision of Greater Eurasia. However, the challenge 
facing Moscow is not to force China to the side road; other actors will also play 
influential roles, in particular regional powers such as India, Japan and the 
European Union. 
India presents a particular problem in that there are no direct discord 
between Moscow and New Delhi. If the fate of Greater Eurasia depended solely on 
the state of Russian-Indian relations, the Kremlin would have good reasons for 
optimism. The difficulty, however, is that New Delhi is strongly opposed to the 
BRI, which it sees as an instrument of China’s strategic dominance over Eurasia 
and a threat to India’s main security interests in South Asia. [47] In particular, the 
Sino-Pakistan Economic Cooperation Corridor (CPEC), if fully implemented, 
could transform the geopolitics and geoeconomics of the subregion. 
While Russia does not have a great influence in the CPEC, its paramount 
importance in the BRI has obvious significance for Greater Eurasia, which focuses 
on Sino-Russian partnerships. The Kremlin can hope to convince other parties that 
it will not promote Beijing's ambitions at their expense. But there is no clear way 
to demonstrate this, given the assertiveness of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy, the 
steady strategic tension between New Delhi and Beijing, and the warmth of US-
Indian ties. Meanwhile, the entry of India and Pakistan into the SCO complicates 
efforts to use this organization as a coordination base for multilateral cooperation 
under Greater Eurasia. 
Like India, Japan reveals a geopolitical interest in countering or containing 
the expansion of Chinese influence in Eurasia. Indeed, one of the main factors, 
prompted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, to draw closer to the Kremlin in recent 
years was Russia's excommunication from China. However, Greater Eurasia 
intends to do the exact opposite - to strengthen the Sino-Russian partnership. Abe's 
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visit to China in October 2018, first Japan prime minister’s visit in seven years, 
suggests that relations between Tokyo and Beijing could improve. But even if this 
positive trend continues - at best an uncertain prospect - it will not eliminate the 
broader logic of Japan’s security alliance with the United States, Tokyo’s 
suspicions about China’s long-term intentions and discomfort due to the closeness 
of Sino-Russian relations. [60] 
The ongoing crisis in Russia's relations with Europe means that Greater 
Eurasia is most likely not a supported idea in key countries such as France and 
Germany. Moscow’s previous proposal to combine two integration projects, the 
EEU and the EU, provoked little positive response in Europe or even in Russia. In 
2015, liberal commentator Vladislav Inozemtsev sharply remarked that “there is 
the EU with its order and there is the Eurasian New-Asia with its own. Only people 
with a vivid imagination could expect amazing results from a combination of order 
and chaos, the original and the forgery.” [95] On the other hand, if the EU begins 
to break up in the coming years, as some experts predict, Russia is unlikely to find 
the EEU-EU integration attractive. It may be true that “Russia’s grand Eurasia 
strategy would not be complete without the eventual rehabilitation of relations with 
Europe” [6], but such “rehabilitation” seems more unachievable than ever, 
considering the enlarging gap between Russia and the West. Once again, the China 
factor raises more worries. Europe's growing concern about the consequences of 
BRI for good governance is growing into considerable disbelief towards Greater 
Eurasia, based, according to many people, on authoritarian norms and ideas. 
Former Soviet Republics: Difference to Russian view of Greater Eurasia is 
also evident among the former Soviet republics. Putin declares his common goal 
with leaders such as Nursultan Nazarbayev, former president of Kazakhstan, 
especially noting that the latter came up with the original idea of Eurasian 
integration back in 1994. Nevertheless, there is a gap between Nazarbayev’s vision 
of post-Soviet integration and the Kremlin’s Greater Eurasia project. The first is 
mainly determined by the economic agenda: to maintain existing trade relations 
with Russia (and other former Soviet republics), as well as significantly expand 
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cooperation with China, the leading Asian economies and Europe. On the contrary, 
Putin is much more interested in political integration, understood as a strict 
coordination of politics. However, the current president of Kazakhstan – Kasym-
Zhomart Tokaev notes the positive perspectives of the project. During his first visit 
in Russia as a president he remarks that “the idea of Greater Eurasia - in the broad 
sense of the term - opens up horizons for enhancing the economic ties between 
Asia and Europe, and can also become the foundation for the formation of a new 
system of international relations in the Eurasian space. The processes taking place 
on our megacontinent, in my opinion, form new geopolitical realities”. [92] This 
puts him in line with Russian perception of Greater Eurasia, at least not at a 
completely different side. What reaps him apart from Russian view is that he 
emphasizes the existing frameworks for such a concept, especially SCO. [92] 
4.2 Capacity Problem 
Another no less serious obstacle to the creation of Greater Eurasia is the 
inadequacy of means that Russia holds. Once again, it has become a formidable 
military power and possesses the natural resources and goods (such as weapons) 
that other countries desire. However, it remains a weak force in other respects. It 
used the weaknesses of the world order led by the United States, but has not yet 
proved that it can become a reliable supplier of global goods in US place. Russia 
probably cannot compete with China and the EU in providing trade and financial 
incentives. A simple public appearance cannot compensate for a lack of substance, 
especially when the Beijing Belt and Road initiative is spreading in many 
directions. 
The problems of the EEU illustrate the difficulties. Despite Russia's 
dominance in the organization and historical ties between its member states, trade 
within the EEU is modest and fragile - for example, the EEU accounts for only 8 
percent of Russia's total trade. [21] Kazakhstan, the most significant member of the 
EEU after Russia, trades with the EU more than twice as much as with Russia, 
while Western countries prevail in its domestic investment flows. The reduction of 
the Russian economy in 2013, amid the annexation of Crimea by Moscow, 
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severely undermined the economic and political authority of Moscow-inspired 
integration projects.  
In these conditions, Russia has limited opportunities. Conventional methods 
of political pressure, cultivating trans-elite interests, intimidation of Western liberal 
influences, or China's dominance are unlikely to work in the more complex context 
of Greater Eurasia. If Moscow cannot even drive out the weak former Soviet 
republics, it will not be able to recruit states that have a much larger sovereign 
choice. In the end, the EEU's inability to provide real benefits to Kazakhstan (in 
particular) is hardly a compelling advertisement for the virtues of Russia-led 
Greater Eurasia. 
4.3 Turns in Russian vectors of politics 
It is unclear how devoted Russia is to the implementation of the Greater 
Eurasia project. “This may be only the last in a long line of quasimultilateral 
enterprises - the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Customs Union, 
and the EAEU - whose main goal was to promote Russia as a dominant force in 
Eurasia. Such mechanisms are only valued as long as they serve this purpose and 
then discarded.” [63, p. 36] Elaborating the topic, at the start of his presidency 
Putin acknowledged that the CIS has “served its purpose”; soon after, it was 
marginalized, although formally it existed. Subsequently, the Customs Union 
became the flagship of Eurasian integration, but it also lost momentum and 
therefore was included in the EEU, which, in turn, may face a similar fate in 
relation to Greater Eurasia. 
The prosperity of the Greater Eurasia enterprise will depend on the 
Kremlin’s persistence in the face of the periodically conflicting agendas of other 
actors, the restrictions of the Russian government and the historical 
Westerncentrism of the Russian elite. On all these points there is room for serious 
doubt. Given the difficulties, Moscow may be tempted to manage the Greater 
Eurasia project in much the same way as it did in the BRICS, namely as a general 
structure in which the true emphasis is on managing key bilateral relations and 
counterweighing the West.  
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Continued Russia support for the Greater Eurasia project will depend on 
many factors: from the level of interest shown by other subjects of Eurasia to the 
state of relations between Russia and the West, in particular with Europe. Much 
will also depend on specific events, such as the flow - or lack of - of Asian 
investment in the Russian Far East. Whatever happens, the need for more details in 
the project is already obvious even to the loudest proponents of Greater Eurasia. 
Karaganov warned that this could “end up in much the same way as many of our 
other undertakings have, such as the initiatives to turn the OSCE into a pan-
European security system and sign a European security treaty.” [84] 
Conclusion to the first chapter 
There are a lot of things that need to be considered while speaking about 
Greater Eurasia concept and its feasibility. In order to understand what rational 
foundations it can be built on, it is needed to study its past, find ideas and 
narratives in the region that cannot divide but unite the peoples of macroregion, 
evaluate the development goals of the Eurasian peoples, understand where they 
intersect, where they can come into conflict with each other and need to be 
coordinated, and where they complement each other, and also highlight those goals 
that can be achieved jointly, with coordination of efforts at the interstate level. 
It is necessary to study modern types of collective security systems and 
understand what experience is most applicable to modern Eurasia. It is necessary to 
try to determine the set of basic values of internal structure and international 
communication shared by all the peoples of the region. Among them, it is 
especially important to identify those values that may play a future role in the 
spiritual and value cohesion of the Eurasian peoples - in creating their collective 
identification. 
It is generally necessary to assess the degree of applicability of the most 
well-established concepts and rules of international communication to the Eurasian 
political and cultural environment, to understand how these concepts and rules are 
refracted in Eurasian conditions. The most effective mechanisms and ways of 
cooperation arose on the western periphery of Eurasia - in Europe, where they are 
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based on a different political tradition. The tradition of cooperation - as a result of 
rational choice - can and should be applicable in Eurasian conditions, but it should 
not only be introduced from outside, but rethought under new acceptable 
conditions. 
It is necessary to look at the strategic prospects and motivation of each of the 
most important Eurasian players. China is the largest Eurasian state. It is almost 
self-sufficient due to its unique demography and economic power and, at first 
glance, does not need to merge into wider communities. But even China cannot 
return to the policy of closeness and, in fact, desires to be global player (on 
Chinese conditions). Russia also due to its demography and other obstacles cannot 
be self-sufficient and therefore must create international communities, the rules of 
communication within which will be more advanced and whose participants will 
be able to share a set of common values. The states of Central Asia, like Mongolia, 
are trying to formulate their development goals based on the need to preserve 
themselves as independent and existing units of international relations. They are 
trying to bet on interaction with large regional and extra-regional players, to 
balance their powerful neighbors. As for the functioning of institutions in Greater 
Eurasia (in particular, the EAEU), it is necessary to create optimal conditions for 
effective intergovernmental interaction.  
Departing from analysis of Greater Eurasia concept, this research narrows 
down its agenda from to-be-all-aspect description to the projects of Russian oil and 




Chapter 2. Energy security. Russian oil and gas companies’ projects within 
the frame of Greater Eurasia  
The possession of powerful hydrocarbon resources, sufficient to cover their 
own needs and large supplies abroad, brings income to the oil and natural gas 
exporting countries to set and solve important economic, social and political 
problems. Such opportunities especially increase during periods of favorable 
conjuncture of world prices. Many suppliers to the world oil and gas market, 
through foreign exchange earnings from their exports, make significant 
investments in the economy, demonstrating phenomenal development dynamics. 
Within the frame of Greater Eurasia, Russia stands out with its enormous 
reserves of hydrocarbon resources. It is important to understand the vectors for 
future analysis of influence which Russian oil and gas companies hold in the 
region reviewing the industry as a whole and projects in particular. 
1. Energy security of Greater Eurasia 
For understanding of the trends in dealing with energy sector of a country it 
is important to understand its viewpoint on energy security. Basically in the 
strategies that defend the countries’ on the energy front can be seen the level of 
dependence of the state from hydrocarbons be it an importing or an exporting 
player. 
In its most general form, the problem of energy security is predetermined by 
the uneven distribution of natural fuel and energy resources across the Earth and 
the territorial mismatch of the main energy-consuming and energy-producing 
countries and regions in the specific socio-economic conditions of human 
development. This leads to the scarcity of a country (territory) in fuel and energy 
and its dependence on countries or regions exporting energy resources. 
In recent years, under the influence of globalization, a new technological 
revolution and changes in the socio-political situation in the world, energy security 
has acquired a new – global – dimension and has become one of the most relevant 
components of global security. At the same time, the content of the concept of 
“energy security” began to change, which expanded significantly, since energy 
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aspects permeate almost all aspects of human activity, and includes security in the 
political, environmental and infrastructural fields and even the problems of 
terrorism and climate change, which is, in the opinion a number of specialists, a 
kind of “public good” [46] [67]. Moreover, according to the IEA, the problem of 
energy security is no longer the lack of energy resources as such, but the provision 
of access to these resources. Accordingly, from this follows the intensification of 
world competition for the rights and conditions of this access. 
There are several reasons for changing the approach to energy security: 
political instability in certain regions of the planet, lack of universally recognized 
regulatory international legal mechanisms, imperfect infrastructure and one-sided 
geography of pipeline routes with an underdeveloped system of maritime 
transportation of natural gas in an environment where gas is becoming increasingly 
important in energy supply of humanity. Moreover, today the problems of national, 
regional, and global energy security are becoming more complicated: competition 
for access to energy resources is tightening; state regulation and control are 
strengthening both on energy markets and energy transportation routes, and the 
degree of inadequate response to threats to energy security by some governments 
developed countries, primarily the USA [61, pp. 20-37]. 
This “revision” of the concept of global energy security is also based on the 
turning point in energy philosophy, which has led to dramatic changes in the 
geopolitical situation in the world and the transition from a policy of international 
energy cooperation to a policy of energy self-sufficiency of the main (or many) 
consumer countries. Thus, the problem of global energy security, which was on the 
agenda of the Group of Eight Summit in St. Petersburg back in 2006, clearly faded 
into the background. At the same time, energy security began to act both as a 
technical and as an economic, political and philosophical category. 
Comprehensive consideration of energy security issues during the formation 
of Greater Eurasia seems especially necessary due to the fact that at present in 
different parts of Eurasia the problem of energy security is understood and 
interpreted in different ways. And these differences are caused not only by the fact 
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that with respect to energy resources, some countries act as their exporters and 
others as importers. The nature of understanding the problem is influenced by 
many factors, including the fact that in modern conditions, as noted above, the 
concept of "energy security" has expanded significantly. Moreover, at present, 
such basic structures of the future Greater Eurasia as the EAEU and the SCO do 
not have an official position on ensuring energy security. 
In the western part of Eurasia, in the EU and other European countries-
importers of energy resources, energy security is understood, first of all, as an 
uninterrupted and stable supply of energy resources for the needs of their 
economies. Moreover, from the point of view of general conceptual approaches, 
American and European views on energy security are similar. American and 
European documents formulate the ambitious goal of drastically reducing 
hydrocarbon dependence and building a long-term hydrocarbon-free economy. In 
the medium term, the following tasks are set: to expand access to hydrocarbons 
and the geography of their supplies; contribute to an increase in hydrocarbon 
production and the introduction of the maximum amount to the market; 
disseminate energy-saving technologies in the world. The initial premise of 
American and European politicians is to reduce dependence on hydrocarbon 
suppliers and have a wide geography of supplies [67] 
The EU countries have traditionally considered the main threats to their 
energy security to be significant dependence on energy imports, as well as high oil 
prices and their fluctuations. Accordingly, the necessary conditions for ensuring 
energy security were called “predictable and stable [political] regimes [in energy 
exporting countries], a stable and clear tax system”, and the absence of “unfair 
administrative barriers”. From this understanding, security measures also ensued: 
to open the markets of resource countries for investment, remove any restrictions 
on the export of energy resources, provide complete information on oil reserves, 
and make transparent the process of managing state revenues from the sale of 
energy resources [3]. At the same time, the process of realizing that the solution to 
the problem of energy security was on the path of economic cooperation.  
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In general, over the past 20 years, the main directions of the EU energy 
security strategy have been the development of the domestic energy market and 
energy efficiency, the increase in national production of renewable energy and 
diversification of energy supplies. 
However, after the “first Russian-Ukrainian gas war” (2006), dependence on 
Russian energy supplies, especially natural gas, became more and more considered 
the main threat to the EU’s energy security. After the crisis and the coup d'etat of 
2014 in Ukraine and a new round of tension in relations with Russia, the thesis 
about the need to diversify gas supplies and reduce dependence on Russia sounded 
with renewed vigor. Moreover, there are three diversification strategies: 
diversification of imported natural gas sources, diversification of natural gas 
supply routes and diversification of energy sources as such [49]. To develop the 
thesis on diversification, the idea of creating the EU Energy Union was put 
forward, implying that its members (EU countries) will negotiate with energy 
suppliers as a single block. 
In the eastern part of Eurasia, the picture with energy security is 
heterogeneous. Thus, OECD countries (in particular, R. Korea and Japan) mainly 
interpret energy security problems and measures to ensure it in the same way as the 
EU and the USA. In particular, there is also a growing understanding that the 
global threat to energy security is the excessive consumption of energy-intensive 
material goods, leading to an unreasonable increase in demand for energy 
resources. However, the main energy resource that can ensure the non-volatility in 
Korea and Japan is considered to be not renewable energy source, but gas hydrates 
[7]. It is also reasonable to note that in terms of ensuring energy security, these 
countries are oriented, first of all, towards cooperation not with the neighboring 
states of Northeast Asia, but with the USA and Canada [61]. 
Almost completely dependent on the external resources of hydrocarbons, the 
OECD Asian countries are making great efforts both to diversify the sources of 
imported oil and gas, which opens up additional opportunities for the development 
of energy cooperation between these countries and Russia, as well as for the 
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development of appropriate infrastructure. The latter becomes particularly relevant 
with increasing imports of liquefied natural gas and trends towards a convergence 
of gas prices in its main regional markets. [Appendix 1]  
The above said shows that in recent years there has been not only a 
significant drop in LNG prices while maintaining their rather high volatility, but 
also the loss of the “premium” label by the gas market of Northeast Asia. 
Understanding the need for a price index that is relevant to the Asian market, the 
leadership and business of many countries in the region, including China, 
Indonesia, etc., are working on creating their own gas hubs. In the near future, 
these measures can not only provide greater flexibility of contracts in the interests 
of consumers and producers, but also increase the reliability of LNG supplies. 
Developing Asian countries, consumers of energy resources, especially the 
poorest, need access to relatively cheap energy, they need confidence that the 
world's oil and gas production will grow, and they can always purchase them in the 
required quantities. Moreover, for those of them that have entered the phase of 
catch-up development, primarily for China and India, a shortage of energy 
resources can erase the very prospect of economic growth and the achievement of 
at least a minimum level of well-being for their population. Hence their desire to 
quickly adapt to a new dependence on world energy markets, which indicates a 
departure from the previous desire for self-sufficiency. There is also a growing 
understanding that the global energy security threat is the low energy efficiency of 
their economies. Accordingly, such countries see the solution to their energy 
security problems, first of all, in international energy cooperation, which provides 
them not only with direct access to energy resources, but also with technologies 
that make it possible to involve local non-traditional energy sources in operation. 
In particular, China began to pay great attention to ensuring energy security 
in recent decades, since the most serious structural problems of Chinese energy are 
the predominance of coal in energy consumption (70%) and dependence on 
external hydrocarbon supplies. So, in 2016, China's dependence on imported oil 
reached 65% (in 2000 - 32%, in 2005 - 41%, in 2010 -55%, in 2015 - 60.6%). 
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Significant dependence of China is also observed on imports of natural gas, which 
amounted to 32.2% in 2014, and in mid-2016 - over 35% [17]. 
Based on the existing and predicted threats in the energy sector, the State 
Council of the PRC in 2004 adopted a “Plan for the Long-Term Development of 
the Energy Sector", designed for 20 years. The plan contains five key strategic 
objectives, one of which is ensuring energy security. And by 2010, China had 
formulated the main tasks of internal and external energy policy, which remain 
relevant to the present. Among the main tasks of foreign energy policy is the 
diversification of energy cooperation and the search for new markets; safety of 
transportation of imported energy resources; attracting foreign investment in the 
development of Chinese energy; cooperation with other countries to create and 
implement advanced energy technologies; diversification of imported types of 
energy, etc. In order to implement the strategy for ensuring the country's energy 
security, the Chinese leadership seeks to use the full range of economic and 
political instruments. Since the mid-1990s, following the example of the United 
States and several European countries, the PRC government began to discuss the 
possibility of forming strategic oil reserves. However, practical work in this area 
came to the fore only in 2002 after the invasion of US troops in Iraq. Somewhat 
later, $ 1.6 billion was allocated from the state budget for these purposes and the 
work “began to boil”: in 2004, the construction of the first strategic oil reserves 
was launched in the provinces of Liaoning, Shandong and Zhejiang. It was planned 
to complete these works by 2020, bringing the storage capacity to 720 million 
barrels. oil, which is equivalent to the volume of its imports for 90 days. Currently, 
according to ICIS estimates, storage capacity is about 683 million barrels. [13] 
An important mechanism for ensuring security, establishing close political 
contacts with the countries of Central Asia, and, in particular, implementing the 
strategy of its own energy supply in the region, has become the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization for China. And, of course, a special place in China's 
foreign economic policy in recent years has been occupied by the Silk Road 
Economic Belt project, recently renamed the One Belt - One Road project [17]. 
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Energy exporting countries and, most of all, Middle East countries, which 
also need stable and predictable energy markets, need stable and/or predictable 
energy prices that ensure their efficient export, are interested in increased oil and 
gas production and high prices for them. However, the inconsistency and a certain 
duality of the positions of the EU and other OECD countries on energy security 
[67, pp. 20-37] is also visible in their approach to the energy policy of oil and gas 
exporting countries. Thus, speaking in words about the recognition of the 
interdependence of producers and consumers of energy resources, against the use 
of energy as an instrument of political blackmail, both the EU and the IEA obstruct 
all that is connected with the so-called “gas OPEC”. For example, on the eve of the 
Ministerial Conference of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) of the 14 
GECF member countries, which was held in Doha, Qatar on April 9-10, 2007, 
another wave of condemnation of the energy policy of world energy exporters was 
raised in the world [44]. 
In Russia, based on the fact that energy security is an essential component of 
the entire energy policy and national security of the leading states of the world, 
they share the generally accepted understanding of this security as a reliable and 
uninterrupted supply of fuel and energy to consumers in the required volumes and 
quality at economically reasonable prices.  However, in recent years there has been 
a certain refinement of the very concept of "energy security". So, in the Energy 
Strategy of Russia for the period until 2030 (ES-2030), adopted in November 
2009, energy security is defined as “the state of protection of the country, its 
citizens, society, the state, the economy from threats to reliable fuel and energy 
supply”. A few years ago, in the Energy Strategy for the period until 2020, energy 
security was understood as “... full and reliable provision of the population and the 
country's economy with energy resources at affordable and at the same time 
stimulating energy saving prices, reducing risks and preventing the development of 
crisis situations in the country's energy supply” [1], [2]. 
At the same time, Russia believes that one of the most important 
components of energy security is a fair sharing of risks between all participants in 
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the energy chain, a balance of interests not only of producers and consumers of 
energy resources, but also of transit countries. Such a balance of interests is 
ensured by the energy security model based on the principles of interdependence 
and interpenetration. This model, implemented through the mutual exchange of 
assets, has established itself well in relations with European, especially German, 
partners in the gas industry, with whom strategic cooperation has been linked to 
Russia for many decades. 
The long-term goal of Russia's energy policy is to maintain a balance with 
all the main geopolitical centers of power: Europe, China and the USA, and to 
develop cooperation with them. This principle of Russia's energy policy reflects its 
role as a central Eurasian power in the subcontinent, affecting, not least, the 
sustainable development of mankind. Russia sees its task not in contrasting 
cooperation with Europe to cooperation with Asia, but in manifesting its special 
role on the continent, due to its geographic location and energy potential, the 
historical mentality of the peoples inhabiting the country. 
As was noted above, experience in solving energy security problems in the 
EU, the USA, and other countries and regions of the world shows that energy 
security is a global problem, that it is impossible to solve it not only on the one-
sided, but even on the bilateral basis. And since humanity in the 21st century lives 
in a globally interdependent world, the energy security system is designed to 
ensure the reliability of energy supplies in the common interests of the global 
economy, and each country, and consumers, and energy producers. Moreover, this 
system should be transparent, based on international law and a responsible policy 
regarding the supply and demand of energy resources. Achieving this “quota” of 
energy security requirements within the Greater Eurasia frame can help to push 
forward the concept as a whole. In this sense it is important to research oil and gas 
projects of the one of the biggest players on the market – Russia. 
2. Projects of Russian oil and gas companies in the framework of 
Greater Eurasia energy security  
2.1 European projects 
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Europe is highly dependent on energy import from third parties. “For its own 
consumption, the EU also needs energy which is imported from third countries. In 
2018, the main imported energy product was petroleum products (including crude 
oil, which is the main component), accounting for almost two thirds of energy 
imports into the EU, followed by gas (24 %) and solid fossil fuels (8 %). Russia is 
the main EU supplier of crude oil, natural gas and solid fossil fuels. The stability of 
the EU’s energy supply may be threatened if a high proportion of imports are 
concentrated among relatively few external partners. In 2018, almost two thirds of 
the extra-EU's crude oil imports came from Russia (30 %), Iraq (9 %) and Saudi 
Arabia, Norway, Kazakhstan and Nigeria (7 % each). A similar analysis shows that 
almost three quarters of the EU's imports of natural gas came from Russia (40 %), 
Norway (18 %) and Algeria (11 %), while almost three quarters of solid fuel 
(mostly coal) imports originated from Russia (42 %), the United States (18 %) and 
Colombia (13 %).” [33] 
In the same sense as Europe is dependent on Russian energy, Moscow is 
dependent on revenues from successful supplies of gas and oil to its partners. This 
interdependency is the cornerstone of the success of projects be it a new pipeline 
infrastructure construction or regular supplies. 
Remarks: for the purpose of research joint projects with Turkey will also be 
included in this section as they fall in the frame of Greater Eurasia. The effects of 
the projects will be analyzed in chapter 3 of this paper. 
Yamal-Europe pipeline 
The transnational gas pipeline Yamal - Europe runs through four countries - 
Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany. The new export corridor has increased the 
flexibility and reliability of Russian gas supplies to Western Europe. The European 
Union has classified the Yamal-Europe project as a priority investment project 
implemented within the Trans-European Network (TEN, Trans-European 
Networks). 
The construction of the gas pipeline began in 1994, and with the 
commissioning of the last compressor station in 2006, the Yamal-Europe gas 
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pipeline reached its design capacity of 32.9 billion cubic meters. m per year. The 
number of compressor stations on the gas pipeline is 14, the diameter of the pipes 
is 1420 mm, and the total length is more than 2 thousand km. 
The main line originates from the Torzhok gas transmission hub in the Tver 
region, where it receives gas from the Northern Regions of the Tyumen Region 
(SRTO) - Torzhok gas pipeline. The Russian section is 402 km long with three 
compressor stations: Rzhevskaya, Kholm-Zhirkovskaya and Smolenskaya. 575 km 
of the gas pipeline pass through Belarus, 5 compressor stations have been built 
here: Nesvizhskaya, Krupskaya, Slonimskaya, Minskaya and Orshanskaya. 
Gazprom is the sole owner of the Belarusian section of the gas pipeline. The Polish 
section includes 683 km of the linear part and 5 compressor stations: Chehanuv, 
Shamotuly, Zambrow, Wloclawek, Kondratki. The Polish section of the gas 
pipeline is owned by EuRoPol Gaz. The westernmost point of the gas pipeline is 
the Malnov compressor station in the Frankfurt an der Oder region near the 
German-Polish border, where the gas pipeline connects to the YAGAL-Nord gas 
transmission system, which, in turn, connects it to the STEGAL-MIDAL-UGS gas 
transmission system Reden. The German section of the pipeline is owned by 
WINGAS. [38] [Appendix 2] 
Nord stream 
Nord Stream is an export gas pipeline from Russia to Europe through the 
Baltic Sea. It directly connects Gazprom and European consumers, bypassing 
transit states. Nord Stream ensures high reliability of Russian gas supplies to 
Europe. 
In December 2000, by the decision of the European Commission, the Nord 
Stream project was given the status of TEN (Trans-European Networks), which 
was confirmed in 2006. This means that Nord Stream is key to ensuring the 
sustainable development and energy security of Europe. In April 2010, 
construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline began in the Baltic Sea. In November 
2011, the first string of the Nord Stream was put into operation; in October 2012, 
the second string. [26] [Appendix 3] 
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Prior to the EU decision to expand Gazprom’s access to the German OPAL 
gas pipeline system in 2015, it was connected only to the OPAL line leading to the 
Czech Republic; at the same time, approximately half (25 billion m³ / year) of the 
design capacity of the gas pipeline is used, which is divided equally between 
consumers in Germany and the Czech Republic. On September 4, 2015 Gazprom, 
BASF, ENGIE, E.On, Shell, and OMV, as co-founders, signed an agreement to 
expand the Nord Stream capacities (the Nord Stream-2 project). [70] This project 
provides for the construction of two more pipelines of the gas pipeline, which will 
increase the full capacity of the existing Nord Stream by 2 times. Germany and 
Russia are trying to remove the OPAL gas pipeline from the EU’s Third Energy 
Package, according to which 50% of the gas pipeline should belong to third parties, 
to which Russia fundamentally, he cannot agree because Gazprom is the only 
natural supplier of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which in turn fills OPAL. 
Efficient use of OPAL capacities would mean a decrease in the role of Ukraine as a 
transit country, and the commissioning of the Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream 
pipelines would mean a complete cessation of transit through its territory. On 
October 28, 2016, information appeared on the achievement of a solution to this 
issue in favor of the withdrawal of the OPAL gas pipeline from under the norms of 
the third energy package until 2033. On December 23, 2016, the European Court 
suspended the decision of the European Commission on the access of Russian 
Gazprom to the OPAL pipeline, as an interim measure for the period of the trial. 
The decision was made at the suit of the Polish company PGNiG and the Polish 
government. In June 2017, the European Court refused to admit Gazprom as a third 
party in the case, and in July of the same year removed the interim measure 
established on December 23, 2016. On August 3, 2017, it was reported that after 
the ban on the use of 40% of the OPAL pipeline’s capacities was lifted, Gazprom 
increased transit through it, the pipeline load increased by more than a quarter due 
to a reduction in gas transit through Ukraine. On September 10, 2019, the 
European Court overturned the decision of the European Commission on a change 
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in the use of the OPAL gas pipeline as adopted in violation of the principle of 
energy solidarity. [53] 
Nord stream 2 
Nord Stream 2 is a new gas export pipeline from Russia to Europe via the 
Baltic Sea. The decision to create the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is based on 
successful experience in the construction and operation of the Nord Stream gas 
pipeline. The new gas pipeline, as well as the existing one, will directly connect 
Gazprom and European consumers and ensure high reliability of Russian gas 
supplies to Europe. 
This is especially important in the face of falling gas production in Europe 
and growing demand for its imports. The Nord Stream 2 project is implemented by 
the Nord Stream 2 AG project company. The entry point of the Nord Stream-2 gas 
pipeline to the Baltic Sea will be the Ust-Luga region of the Leningrad Region, and 
then the gas pipeline will pass along the bottom of the Baltic Sea and will reach 
Germany in the Greifswald area, not far from the Nord Stream exit point. [A The 
length of the route is more than 1200 km. The total capacity of the two Nord 
Stream 2 strings is 55 billion cubic meters. m of gas per year. Thus, the total design 
capacity of Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 is 110 billion cubic meters. m of gas 
per year.  
In October 2012, Nord Stream shareholders reviewed the preliminary results 
of a feasibility study on the construction of the third and fourth pipelines and 
decided that their construction was economically feasible and technically feasible. 
Later, the project for the construction of the third and fourth threads was called 
“Nord Stream - 2”. [31] [Appendix 3] 
In April 2017, Nord Stream 2 AG signed an agreement with ENGIE, OMV, 
Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper and Wintershall to finance the Nord Stream 2 gas 
pipeline project. Five European companies will provide long-term financing in the 
amount of 50% of the total project cost. In September 2018, the laying of a gas 
pipeline in the Baltic Sea began. Pipe laying was planned to be completed no later 
than the fourth quarter of 2019. These plans could not be implemented in 
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connection with the position of Denmark, which did not give permission to lay the 
pipeline through its exclusive economic zone. In December 2019, the construction 
of the submarine pipeline, with a readiness of 93.5%, was suspended due to U.S. 
sanctions. 
Although foreign partners verbally support Nord Stream 2, which has come 
under American sanctions, Russia will have to complete the gas pipeline on its 
own, without foreign partners. Russia has two pipe-laying vessels at its disposal: 
the first is a large Fortuna pipe-laying barge owned by 
Mezhregiontruboprovodstroy OJSC (which, however, does not have a dynamic 
positioning system and, due to technical restrictions, cannot lay more than 1.5 km 
of pipes per day) and the second is the Akademik Chersky pipe-laying vessel, 
owned by Gazprom, which was involved in the Sea of Okhotsk at the time of the 
imposition of sanctions. In January 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin, 
following talks with Angela Merkel, expressed the hope that work would be 
completed by the end of 2020 or in the first quarter of 2021 and the gas pipeline 
would work [66]. 
Despite the incompleteness of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, from January 1, 
2020, Russian gas went along the first line of the EUGAL gas pipeline (it is a 
continuation of Nord Stream 2 through the territory of Germany to the Czech 
border, was commissioned at the end of 2019) ; this gas comes from the existing 
Nord Stream [55]. 
Nord Stream 2 is facing new challenges, now in Germany. On Friday, May 
15, the Federal Networks Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) refused to allow Nord 
Stream 2 AG, the project operator, to exempt the gas pipeline under construction 
from complying with the EU Third Energy Package. The EU Gas Directive (part of 
the Third Energy Package) provides for the exemption from its rules of gas 
pipelines from third countries that were “ready” on May 23, 2019. Since Nord 
Stream-2 was not completely laid at that time, the German Federal Network 
Agency rejected Nord Stream 2 AG's request for exemption from the directive. 
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Thus, Nord Stream-2 will be complying with German law and European standards 
of unbundling, access to the pipeline and tariff.  
Turkish stream 
Turkish Stream is a new export gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey through 
the Black Sea. The first of the two pipelines is intended for gas supplies to Turkish 
consumers, the second - for gas supply to the countries of Southern and Southeast 
Europe. The total capacity of Turkish Stream is 31.5 billion cubic meters. m (15.75 
billion cubic meters each thread). The starting point for the gas supply to the 
Turkish Stream is the Russkaya compressor station (CS), which is part of the 
UGSS of Russia and was built in the region of Anapa. It provides the necessary 
pressure for transporting gas through two lines of the pipeline to a distance of more 
than 930 km to the coast of Turkey, where gas flows to the receiving terminal. [37] 
[Appendix 4] 
On December 1, 2014, Gazprom and the Botas Petroleum Pipeline 
Corporation signed a memorandum of understanding on the construction of a gas 
pipeline through the Black Sea in the direction of Turkey. In September 2016, 
Gazprom received the first permits of the authorities of the Republic of Turkey for 
the implementation of the Turkish Stream. On October 10, 2016, an Agreement 
was signed between the Government of the Russian Federation and the 
Government of the Republic of Turkey on the Turkish Stream project. In 
December 2016, a contract was signed between South Stream Transport B.V. and 
Allseas Group S.A. for the construction of the first string of the offshore section of 
the Turkish Stream gas pipeline with the option to lay the second string. In 
February 2017, South Stream Transport B.V. concluded a contract with Allseas 
Group for the construction of the second string of the offshore section of the 
Turkish Stream gas pipeline. On May 7, 2017, the construction of the Turkish 
Stream gas pipeline began in the Black Sea. Work started off the Russian coast. On 
November 19, 2018, the laying of a gas pipeline in the Black Sea was completed.  
As of January 27, 2020 first billion cubic meters of gas delivered via Turkish 
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Stream. About 54% of this volume was delivered to the Turkish gas market, about 
46% - to the Turkish-Bulgarian border. [37] 
Blue stream 
The Blue Stream gas pipeline is designed to supply Russian natural gas to 
Turkey through the Black Sea, bypassing third countries. Blue Stream supplements 
the gas transmission corridor from Russia to Turkey, which passes through the 
territory of Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. Blue Stream significantly 
increased the reliability of gas supplies to Turkey, and also contributes to the 
development of the gas market and gas infrastructure of this country. [Appendix 8] 
[19] 
On December 15, 1997, an intergovernmental agreement was signed 
between Russia and Turkey. Under this agreement, Gazprom entered into a 
commercial contract with the Turkish company Botas for the supply of 365 billion 
cubic meters of gas to Turkey via the Blue Stream gas pipeline for 25 years. In 
February 1999, Gazprom and the Italian company Eni signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on joint participation in the implementation of the Blue Stream 
project. On November 16, 1999, Gazprom (PJSC Gazprom from July 17, 2015) 
and Eni registered the Russian-Italian special-purpose company Blue Stream 
Pipeline Company BV in the Netherlands on an equal footing. Now this company 
is the owner of the offshore section of the gas pipeline, including the compressor 
Station "Coastal". The owner and operator of the onshore section of the gas 
pipeline is PJSC Gazprom. The construction of the 396 km long Blue Stream 
offshore section began in September 2001 and was completed in May 2002. On 
December 30, 2002, the Blue Stream gas pipeline was commissioned. Industrial 
gas supplies through the gas pipeline began in February 2003. [19] 
It is worth noting that at the request of the Turkish side in certain periods the 
daily volumes supplied through the Blue Stream gas pipeline correspond to the 
level of its design capacity. This is due to the fact that Turkey faces non-fulfillment 
of supply obligations by Iran, and Gazprom, meeting the Turkish colleagues, 
compensates for these shortages. [19] 
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2.2 Asian projects 
In this section will mostly be told about projects with China as a one of the 
most important players for Greater Eurasia. China is the largest oil and gas 
importer in the world. [Appendix 5] [59] “This is a really big deal for other 
consumers: oil and gas supply over 60% of the world’s energy.  China has 1.4 
billion people, a government obsessed with economic growth, energy usage that 
accounts for 25% of the world’s total, and an ever-extending global reach that has 
procuring energy supplies at its core, namely oil and gas in any area, any country at 
any time. Oil and gas constitute a rising 30% of China’s total energy demand.” 
[59] Other than Russia-Chinese projects, “talks” on project with South Korea will 
be covered. 
Pipeline system "Eastern Siberia - Pacific Ocean" 
East Pipeline is an oil pipeline running from Taishet (Irkutsk Region) to the 
Kozmino oil port in Nakhodka Bay. It connects the fields of Western and Eastern 
Siberia with the markets of Asia and the USA. The length is 4,740 km. The 
operator of the pipeline is the state-owned Transneft Company. The grade of oil 
supplied to the world market through ESPO is called ESPO. The development of 
the project and the construction of the pipeline are carried out on the basis of the 
order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated December 31, 2004 No. 
1737-r. [Appendix 6] [28] 
In January 2006, the project developed by Transneft did not pass the state 
environmental review, as it provided for the construction of an oil pipeline in a 
seismically dangerous zone at a distance of 700-800 m from the northern tip of 
Lake Baikal. Rostekhnadzor also rejected the proposal to use Perevoznaya Bay as 
the end point of the pipeline: this bay cannot accept deep-sea vessels, and the Far 
Eastern Marine Reserve is located next to it. However, after President Putin’s visit 
to China in early 2006 and as a result of massive pressure on expert organizations, 
the project was soon approved (March 1, 2006). At the same time, the issue of the 
ESPO endpoint was decided to be re-examined during 2006. On March 22 and 
April 5, 2006, the State Duma, adopting the Water Code in the second and third 
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reading, respectively, introduced (at the suggestion of deputies from the Irkutsk 
region) the provision that the water protection zone of Lake Baikal includes deltas 
of rivers flowing into the lake and runs along the tops of the ranges, the slopes of 
which are adjacent to the lake. In other words, a ban was imposed on any 
construction 20 km from the shoreline of Lake Baikal. On April 12, 2006, the State 
Duma unexpectedly returned to the discussion of the already adopted Water Code 
and adopted an important amendment that removes legislative restrictions on 
construction near Lake Baikal. Thereby, Transneft’s intentions to hold an oil 
pipeline in the immediate vicinity of the lake were supported. In March - April 
2006, protest rallies were held in Irkutsk, Tomsk, Moscow, Yekaterinburg and 
other cities. In addition to environmentalists, the governor of the Irkutsk region, 
Alexander Tishanin, and the envoy to the Siberian Federal District, Anatoly 
Kvashnin, also defended the lake. Ecological organizations Greenpeace and WWF 
tried to prevent the laying of the oil pipeline in the immediate vicinity of Lake 
Baikal. Residents of the Khabarovsk Territory and local organizations filed a 
lawsuit in the Supreme Court to annul the order on the construction of the ESPO, 
but were defeated. On April 26, 2006, during a meeting with Siberian governors in 
Tomsk, President Putin unexpectedly announced the need to revise the project in 
order to draw an oil pipeline no closer than 40 kilometers from the northern coast 
of Lake Baikal. According to experts, changing the route was supposed to 
significantly increase the cost of the project and the construction time of the pipe. 
But at the same time, the ESPO in the new version of the route approached the 
largest oil and gas fields in the north of the Irkutsk region and Yakutia 
(Talakansky, Verkhnechonsky, Chayandinsky, Srednebotuobinsky and others), 
making it possible to reduce the cost of the construction of supply pipelines and 
infrastructure. On April 28, 2006 in Taishet, the first joints of the laid pipes of the 
oil pipeline were welded - the construction of the ESPO began. In early May 2008, 
it was reported that Transneft terminated relations with the general contractor 
Krasnodarstroytransgaz and decided to hold a new tender for the construction of 
the Aldan - Tynda oil pipeline. On October 4, 2008, part of the oil pipeline from 
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the Talakanskoye oil field to Tayshet with a length of 1,105 km was put into 
operation in reverse mode. On October 15, 2008, the Verkhnechonskoye oil field 
in the Irkutsk region was connected to the pipeline. Deliveries from it will also so 
far be carried out in reverse.  On April 27, 2009, Transneft completed welding of 
the linear part of the first stage of ESPO.  On April 27, 2009, construction began 
on a branch from ESPO to China in Russia. During the ceremony of welding the 
first seam, an act was signed to begin work. In May 2009, construction of a branch 
in the Chinese section began in Heilongjiang Province. On July 20, 2009, the 
government of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution on zeroing customs 
duties on oil exports from 13 fields in Eastern Siberia. This measure is designed to 
enhance the development of the region’s subsoil, which serves as a resource base 
for filling the ESPO pipeline. On October 24, 2009, at 2 hours Moscow time, the 
last, 2757 km of the linear part of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline system 
(ESPO I) was filled with oil.  On December 28, 2009, Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin launched the first phase of ESPO, launching the shipment of oil to a tanker 
bound for Hong Kong. Total costs for the construction of the first phase of the 
pipeline amounted to 378 billion rubles, and another 60 billion rubles. - for the 
construction of the port of Kozmino. On September 27, 2010, completion of the 
allotment from ESPO to China was announced.  In November 2010, the 
Government of the Russian Federation expressed gratitude to Transneft with the 
wording “for the great contribution to the development of cooperation in the field 
of energy between the Russian Federation and China, as well as in connection with 
the completion of the construction of the Skovorodino-Chinese border with the oil 
pipeline”. In July 2012, Transneft began to fill with oil the second stage of the 
pipeline (ESPO-2). In December 2012, the ESPO-2 oil pipeline was 
commissioned.  On December 15, 2014, three oil pumping stations (pump stations 
No. 11, 15 and 19) were put into operation, built as part of the ESPO-1 expansion 
project, which made it possible to increase the capacity of ESPO-1 to 58 million 
tons of oil per year. On November 27, 2019, Transneft PJSC brought the Eastern 
Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline system (TSO ESPO) to maximum capacity. The 
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official ceremony took place during a meeting of the company's board of directors 
in Moscow in the form of a telebridge with Bratsk and Khabarovsk, where control 
centers for pipeline sections are located, as well as the port of Kozmino, the final 
point of the ESPO. Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation A.V. Novak and 
President of the company N.P. Tokarev was given the command to launch the 
constructed oil pumping stations to put the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean TS into 
operation at maximum capacity. The heads of Transneft-Vostok LLC and 
Transneft-Far East LLC reported on the successful launch of new production 
facilities, reporting that ESPO-1 was brought to its maximum capacity of 80 
million tons and ESPO-2 to 50 million tons of oil per year. The port of Kozmino, 
which is the final destination of the main oil pipeline, confirmed its readiness to 
start accepting increased volumes of Russian ESPO oil. [28] 
The completion of the construction and commissioning of the oil pipeline 
made it possible to reduce the costs of the construction and energy supply of the 
Power of Siberia gas pipeline. [31] 
Power of Siberia 
Power of Siberia is the largest gas transportation system in the east of 
Russia. At present, the Power of Siberia gas pipeline (the “eastern” route) 
transports gas from the Chayandinskoye field - the base for the Yakutia gas 
production center - to Russian consumers in the Far East and to China. At the end 
of 2022, gas supply to the Power of Siberia will begin with another field - the 
Kovyktinsky, on the basis of which the Irkutsk gas production center is formed. 
[Appendix 7] [31] 
In May 2014, Gazprom and the China National Oil and Gas Corporation 
(CNPC) signed an Agreement on the sale of Russian gas via the eastern route 
(Power of Siberia gas pipeline). The contract is concluded for a period of 30 years 
and involves the supply of 38 billion cubic meters to the PRC. m of gas per year. In 
September 2014, Gazprom began construction of the first section of the Power of 
Siberia gas pipeline, from the Chayandinskoye field in Yakutia to 
Blagoveshchensk (border with China), with a length of about 2,200 km. At the 
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second stage, a section will be built from the Kovykta field in the Irkutsk region to 
Chayandinsky - about 800 km. It is planned that the field will be commissioned at 
the end of 2022. The third stage is the expansion of gas transmission capacities in 
the area from the Chayandinskoye field to Blagoveshchensk. In September 2016, 
Gazprom and CNPC signed an EPC contract for the construction of an underwater 
crossing of the Power of Siberia cross-border section across the Amur River. The 
construction of the crossing from the Chinese side began in April 2017, and in 
May, a temporary bilateral checkpoint across the Russian-Chinese border was 
opened to provide access and unhindered work of construction equipment and 
personnel in the border zone. On December 2, 2019, the Power of Siberia gas 
pipeline was put into operation. The first ever pipeline deliveries of Russian gas to 
China have begun. [30] 
Power of Siberia 2 (Altai) 
The Power of Siberia - 2 (formerly Altai) is planned as the main gas pipeline 
between the gas fields of Western Siberia and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous 
Region in western China. There, it can connect with the Chinese West-East gas 
pipeline, through which gas will reach Shanghai. The planned length of the 
pipeline is about 6,700 km, of which 2,700 km must pass through the territory of 
Russia. [Appendix 9] The estimated diameter of the pipes is 1420 mm. The 
resource base of the gas pipeline is the new large Chayandinskoye field; in 2022, 
another new and larger one, the Kovykta field, should be connected to the gas 
pipeline. The preliminary project cost is, according to various estimates, from 4.5-5 
billion rubles up to 10-13.6 billion US dollars. [5] 
In the spring of 2006, during a visit to China, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin said that in 2011 an export gas pipeline would be built from Russia to this 
country, through which up to 80 billion m³ of natural gas would be transported per 
year. According to Putin, gas will go to China through two routes - from Western 
and Eastern Siberia. In October 2008, numerous Russian media outlets, citing an 
official report allegedly circulated by the Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation, announced that, due to their uncompetitiveness and economic 
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inexpediency, the Altai gas pipeline project was taken out of the general scheme 
for the development of the Russian gas industry until 2030 [91], in this connection, 
the Ministry of Energy was forced to state that it did not disseminate such official 
messages and that the “General Scheme for the Development of the Gas Industry 
for the Period until 2030” is still at the design and review stage, and the economic 
and other risks associated with the implementation the Altai project, are taken into 
account by Gazprom and the Ministry of Energy, and, according to the preliminary 
version of the General Scheme, the final decision on the project will be made after 
conducting a feasibility study for the construction.[77] At the APEC 2014 summit 
held in Beijing in November 2014, along with the signed agreement in May 2014 
on gas supplies to China via the eastern route “Power of Siberia”, a memorandum 
and framework agreement was signed to almost double the gas supply to China, 
due to the capacity of the western route "Altai". 
In early February 2020, the Minister of Energy of Kazakhstan, Nurlan 
Nogaev, renewed interest in negotiations on the possibility of passing the Power of 
Siberia-2 gas pipeline through the republic with further accession to the West-East 
Chinese gas pipeline system. At the same time, the head of the Ministry of Energy, 
Alexander Novak, announced the start of work on assessing the possibility of 
Russian gas supplies to China through the “Power of Siberia-2” through Mongolia. 
He also did not rule out the possibility of gasification of the Pavlodar region of 
Kazakhstan due to this gas pipeline. May 18, 2020 Gazprom began designing a gas 
pipeline through Mongolia to China. The estimated capacity of the pipe will be 50 
billion cubic meters of gas per year [56]. 
“Talks” on Trans-Korean gas pipeline project 
A gas pipeline running from the Russian Far East through the Korean 
peninsula to supply both Koreas with Russian gas was first proposed in 1991, and 
Gazprom, South Korea, and North Korea signed a preliminary agreement to 
construct such a pipeline in 2011. Initial estimates suggested that the 12 billion 
cubic meters annually (bcma) pipeline would cost around $6.3 billion to construct. 
To secure North Korean support for the project, Russia suggested that the North 
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would receive $100 million per year in transit payments if it allowed construction, 
and forgave 90 percent of the North’s debt in 2014. 
Though there have been no recent statements reassessing the viability of this 
project, there is obvious political complexity involved in delivering energy to 
South Korea via its northern rival. Until now, North Korea’s impassability has 
made the South into an energy “island” like Japan, making coastal LNG import 
terminals a much less risky gas importation option. 
Commenting on the general situation, the Director of the Institute of 
Economics and Energy of Korea, Cho Yong Sung, noted that a situation conducive 
to cooperation in the field of pipeline gas supplies is being formed in Northeast 
Asia. "Russia is pursuing a policy aimed at actively increasing gas supplies to 
Asia, compensating for excessive dependence on European customers ... In East 
Asia itself, demand for gas is growing. For example, in our Republic of Korea 
(RK), a number of major contracts expire in 2025. For gas imports from Oman, 
Malaysia, Qatar and other countries, and therefore we need to think about new 
suppliers, about new contracts,” he said. [76] 
Lee Song-gyu, head of the North-East Energy Cooperation Division at the 
Institute of Economics and Energy of Korea, predicted that by 2040, Europe’s 
share of Russian gas exports will decrease from the current 90 to 60 percent, while 
the share of Asia-Pacific will increase from 7 to 40 percent. [76] 
As a possible area of cooperation, Cho Yong Song pointed to a rather long-
discussed project for laying a gas pipeline from Russia to South Korea through the 
territory of the DPRK. He acknowledged that the project has enough risks, but both 
this cooperation and the other in the gas sector with the involvement of 
surrounding powers has good prospects for implementation. "Pipeline cooperation, 
based on economic mutual benefit and connecting the Russian Federation, China, 
Japan, South, North Korea, will contribute to the creation of a lasting peace system 
in Northeast Asia. This is exactly what happened with the cooperation between the 
USSR and Western Europe in the gas sector, which started during the Cold War 
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years, it successfully passed through this period of confrontation and continues to 
be implemented now, "the Korean expert noted. [76] 
Professor of Kunming University (Seoul) Andrei Lankov pointed out that 
such ambitious projects are primarily hindered by political risks that are present 
both from North Korea, and South Korea, the United States and other powers. "The 
economic benefits of the same project for laying a gas pipeline from Russia 
through the DPRK to South Korea are obvious, but I have to be realistic. So far 
there are too many political obstacles to implementation - from the DPRK nuclear 
issue, to sanctions against Russia, North Korea and the variability of the South 
leadership’s approach regarding cooperation with Pyongyang. I think a lot of time 
will pass before our dreams become reality, "the scientist said. [76] 
The first vice-rector of the Samara National Research University, Roman 
Samsonov, pointed to various possible ways of delivering gas from Russia to 
South Korea, including laying a pipe through North Korea, as well as continuing 
the gas pipeline from China through the Yellow Sea. Samsonov also emphasized 
that gas deliveries through a pipe are usually cheaper than in a liquefied form. [76] 
A well-known energy expert, President of the Korea Natural Gas Forum Ryu 
Zhi Chol, emphasizing the great potential economic and political benefits of 
cooperation in the supply of gas from Russia to Kazakhstan, pointed out the 
necessary preliminary conditions for the implementation of this project. In his 
opinion, this will become possible when the DPRK abandons the nuclear program 
and begins to separate issues of energy cooperation from possible political 
differences. [76] 
The head of the North-East Energy Cooperation Division of the Institute of 
Economics and Energy of Korea, Lee Song Gyu, pointed out the need for joint 
efforts by all interested parties to strengthen mutual trust, as well as readiness to 
resolve all possible conflicts and differences in a constructive manner. [76] 
Conclusion to the second chapter 
There are a lot of potentially promising projects that fall in the frame of the 
transforming issue of energy security of Greater Eurasia. This can become or more 
55 
 
likely has already became a big opportunity for Russia to connect its Eurasian 
partners not only on the level actively discussed The Belt and Road initiative and 
within the borders of EAEU but on the base of gas and oil projects.  
Firstly, in the current agenda of Russia in the sector of energy security is to 
bypass the transit countries and achieve its energy export independence. From the 
projects it is seen that many of them, speaking about European projects, create a 
workaround sidestepping the “problem zones” (Belarus, Ukraine and 
Bulgaria).This will be researched more thorough in the Chapter 3 of this paper. 
Secondly, the gas market in Asia is still comparably new for Russian 
companies. It makes inevitable for Russia to meet expectations and promised 
numbers to win over the new customers and diversify its export structure of natural 




Chapter 3. Oil and gas power as the instrument of influence in Greater 
Eurasia frame 
Since 2000, Russia has gradually begun to abandon the old Soviet approach, 
which emphasized the need to maintain and deploy its military power to ensure its 
geopolitical position. Instead, Moscow has gone in the direction of initial build-up 
and started to use its economic resources to encourage neighboring states to work 
more closely with its regional policies. 
Russia may not be able to compete with the United States in the nature and 
global scale of its “soft power”. Harvard professor Joseph Nye defines this in his 
work on changing the nature of state power, based on three sources: “the culture 
[of the state] (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (where 
they correspond to them”) inside country and abroad) and its foreign policy (where 
they are regarded as legal and possessing moral authority)” [14, p. 11].  
Ultimately, the opportunity for Russia to change modalities in Eurasia 
directly returns to energy. Russia's ability to use soft power resources and expand 
its economic and political influence stems from its oil and gas power. The growth 
of the unforeseen situation with high oil and gas prices since 1999 stimulated 
Russia's economic growth, allowed it to carry out some important reforms and 
gave it the opportunity to become the “new Russia” in the country and abroad, 
including far beyond the borders of the CIS. Oil and gas have made Russia 
something indispensable on the modern world stage. 
The real energy potential for Russia may lie in gas, and not in oil. An 
increase in energy demand in Asia, especially in the static energy sector, is driving 
up demand for natural gas. China is particularly keen to increase gas imports 
[Appendix 5], given its previous policy to shift from coal to gas. China and South 
Korea would like to meet their future energy needs by increasing gas consumption 
to ease dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Global gas markets are changing in 
response. Currently, gas is the fastest growing resource in terms of energy 
consumption looking at the tendencies in the world [Appendix 10]. Domestic 
energy sectors in many countries still need major structural changes and large-scale 
57 
 
infrastructure development to move towards a greater use of gas. More than a 
quarter of the world's gas consumption crosses international borders, either by 
pipeline or in the form of LNG. In particular, LNG and its transportability beyond 
regional borders imply great long-term potential for Russia. Russia overshadows 
Saudi Arabia and other gas producing countries. Its gas reserves, which make up 
slightly less than a quater of the total proven reserves in the world, far exceed the 
reserves of any other country. And Gazprom, as a company, alone owns around 17 
to 20 percent of the world's gas reserves (different sources give different statistics) 
[see 20, 23, 36]. Russia through Gazprom is already the dominant global exporter 
of gas. If current trends in gas consumption in Europe continue, Russia 
undoubtedly is becoming the main supplier of gas - if not in general - energy - to 
Europe in the next few decades.  [Appendix 11] [Appendix 12] Russia is better 
prepared to enter the markets in Asia for natural gas than for oil that is from the 
fact that most of the new projects in the energy sector are gas related as seen in 
Chapter 2 of this paper. 
 1.  Impact on Europe 
Currently Europe is in energy dependant on third supplier, largest of which 
is Russia, according to Eurostat statistics [33]. Six years ago, the rhetoric of the 
statements of the Bundestag deputies clearly defined the essence of the common 
position of Berlin in relation to the United States, Russia and its gas. In a 
conversation with Russian journalists, they noted that they support the imposition 
of sanctions, welcome fuel competition and fear Moscow’s gas weapons. But as 
time goes the shifts in opinions and sayings are quite noticeable: “Germany is not a 
US colony, and Nord Stream-2 is a source of secure supplies to Europe, which is 
also needed to solve problems in the sphere of economy and energy reform”. [12, 
p. 5] 
At the Berlin Conference “Prospects for Energy Cooperation between Russia 
and the European Union. The Gas Aspect” Klaus Ernst, Chairman of the 
Bundestag Committee on Economics and Energy, said that today the United States 
is practically imposing its opinion on Europe’s energy supply. According to Ernst, 
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the United States wants to sell its gas on the European market, but the methods by 
which they achieve this are not always acceptable. Moreover, they are directed not 
only against the Russians, but also against the European companies involved in the 
construction of the Nord Stream-2. “The actions of the American ambassador to 
the FRG are simply unacceptable at present, it seems that we are a US colony,” he 
said. Klaus Ernst emphasized that for environmental reasons, natural gas from 
Russia is more attractive to Germany than liquefied gas from America. “When it 
comes to gas prices, American gas is also uncompetitive,” he added. [22] 
Hugo Daiggraaf, a member of the board and technical director of the 
German company Wintershall, which is Gazprom’s Nord Stream 2 partner, was of 
the same opinion. He is sure that the EU needs Russian gas to solve environmental 
problems, as well as for energy reform in Germany. "We will not be able to solve 
the tasks of protecting the environment, to get out of coal energy without Russian 
gas," said Wintershall technical director, adding that "the EU and Russia should 
have a constructive dialogue in this regard." [22] 
“The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline under construction is important for Europe, 
as it will allow more gas to be received, and US extraterritorial sanctions in this 
context are unacceptable and require retaliatory measures.” This was a statement to 
a Russian media correspondent by the head of the Bundestag committee on 
economics and energy, Klaus Ernst. [65] 
“Nord Stream 2 is important if only because it can deliver additional 
volumes of gas to Europe. It's up to Germany and Europe to decide from whom to 
buy gas, and this doesn't depend on the crisis around the coronavirus. The 
extraterritorial sanctions of the USA against enterprises, including European ones, 
which are involved in the construction of the project, are unacceptable and require 
tough response from Europe. For example, sanctions against American fracking 
gas", Ernst said. [65] 
In his opinion, restrictive measures are detrimental to economic relations 
between Russia and the EU countries. This leads to the fact that the Russian 
Federation replaces imported goods with its own production, or enhances trade 
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with China. According to Ernst, this does not meet the interests of Europe, because 
"a strong Europe can only be with the involvement of Russia". [65] 
These statements show the overall dynamic in shifting towards partnership 
(at least in the energy sector), despite sanctions imposed. Of course it does not 
show pinpoint tendency in every European country, but Germany is the largest 
importer of Russian gas in Europe and a big player in EU. Going deeper into the 
whole geopolitical situation between Europe and Russia, the first thing that should 
be said is that the market should not worry about “political colors and shades,” 
since profit is always in the first place. Theoretically, that is how it should be. In 
fact, for decades the energy wars were observant, putting politics above the 
economy and decreasing its development speed. Although, speaking objectively, 
Russian energy resources remain the best offer on the European energy market. 
The fact that the economic competitiveness of any country, including any 
European one, depends on the cost of energy, is clear to everyone. The fact, that 
the new energy development tendencies in the European region start to shift 
towards “going green” policies, opens a question on the relevancy of energy wars 
nowadays. 
As stated above the rhetoric that was predominant five-six years ago is 
“Russia is aggressor: geopolitics is more important than economy” and to some 
extent this rhetoric holds truth: Russia's policy was not always similar to that of the 
European Union, but Donald Trump, the current president of the United States also 
adopted a protectionist policy, starting trade wars with both Europe and China 
[93]. Although the confrontation with Beijing can be defined as geopolitical, it is 
unclear what civilizational differences could arise in NATO. 
While US seek to enter a new technological cycle, Europe is captured by its 
geopolitics. Europe itself lacks unity: Germany, France and Italy are looking for 
ways to build relations with Russia, at least in the economic sphere (progress in 
some areas, and projects in others). At the same time, the Polish leadership says 
that liquefied gas from the United States will cost 20-30 percent cheaper than 
Russian gas transported through pipelines. [79] This is only possible if the United 
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States subsidizes LNG supplies. This is another example where geopolitics prevails 
over the economy. The United States is clearly not going to subsidize LNG 
supplies to Germany and France. Funds should flow - but in a completely different 
direction. 
On the other hand, Moscow has always been pursuing an active energy 
policy. However, as the successor to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited a gas 
transportation system oriented almost exclusively to Europe, which by the 
beginning of the 2000s did not correspond to the country's new ambitions in the 
new geopolitical conditions. The ongoing gas wars with Ukraine have repeatedly 
proved the simple fact that the infrastructure could not provide a sufficient level of 
diversification. Therefore, Russia decided with the help of its gas and oil 
companies to develop an extensive network of new gas transportation routes, such 
as Blue Stream, Nord Stream, Power of Siberia and other projects. All this is based 
on the same idea that there should be no transit countries that could potentially 
interfere with Russian gas supplies. This conclusion was reached by the 
authoritative American agency Bloomberg at the end of 2019 [69]. But in 
accordance with the not sophisticated formula so popular in US, the emphasis was 
on the idea that the Kremlin uses its energy sources to pursue its "aggressive and 
expansionist policies."  
Czech journalists offer a slightly more objective picture of Russian energy 
projects. He supposes that Russia, like US, uses energy cooperation as a lever of 
pressure for its partners. But the Czechs can somewhat understand the logic of the 
Kremlin’s energy geopolitics and their desire to protect their supplies from 
militantly anti-Russian Poland and Ukraine.[73] Czech Republic, which is far from 
the world Russophile capital, believes that Moscow makes a distinction between 
NATO and the EU in its political understanding. Thinking of the former as a direct 
threat [74], Russia considers the EU as a strategic partner for multifaceted 
cooperation [57]. 
It should be noticed that for a fairly long time, the United States, with 
varying degrees of success, impeded the implementation of Russian energy 
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projects on the continent. Germany “withstood” Washington’s strike in the Baltic 
States and did not abandon Nord Stream 2: even the suspension of the 93 percent 
completed project at the end of 2019 due to US sanctions did not shake the 
Germans' political determination to bring it to an end, to its logical conclusion 
[65].  
At the end of 2014, under pressure Bulgaria unexpectedly abandoned the 
South Stream project, which at that time was a heavy blow for the Russia, since 
several billion euros had already been invested in developing the infrastructure in 
southern Russia needed for the gas pipeline. In 2015, Turkey expressed interest in 
the energy project, prompting the transformation of the South Stream into the 
Turkish Stream. Thus, Russia has a fairly clear political goal - to spread its 
influence in European countries; therefore, the pipeline had to get to the Balkans 
one way or another. But, in addition to politics, it is about diversifying the 
economy: although Brussels, in the name of the EU, announces its intention to 
cease its dependence on Russian gas, Moscow does basically the same thing under 
the radar, gradually increasing the number of its partners. 
While the European energy market is being redistributed, despite the West’s 
policy of sanctions and restrictions against Russia and the unfair game of the 
United States with competitors in the market, Russia in its policy continues to 
strive to create additional gas routes from Russia to Europe. Of course, the 
European market is a source of income for many billions of euros for Russia, but, 
implementing new energy projects, Moscow also has long-term plans. In fact, it 
was the President of Russia over the years who strove to establish closer ties 
between Russia and Europe, while his idea of creating a common space from 
Lisbon to Vladivostok was central to Russian foreign policy until 2014. Now the 
tendencies of a kind of “resurrection” of this idea are seen in the Greater Eurasia 
concept but from other side with support of strong China. 
As final words of this section it is also worthwhile mentioning the statement 
from a recent article of an international journalist, Theodor Zima, on European 
website devoted to diplomacy studies: “We are entering a new era in which the 
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West is no longer the world’s only pole, so what we need is the consolidation in 
the face of rapidly developing South-East Asian countries. As far as Russia is 
concerned, so long as Vladimir Putin is its leader, this “window of opportunity” 
remains open, although not as wide open as it was before 2014. If the opponents of 
cooperation with Europe prevail in the Russian authorities, the only thing left to us 
will be to feel how wrong the policy of discrimination against Russia has been. 
And all the bitterness of disappointment. Yet time will be foolishly and irreversibly 
lost.”[94] 
2. Impact on Asia 
It is impactful to mention that the main focus of the section will be on 
Russian-Chinese connections for the reason that, as of now, there is no particular 
impact from the “talks”, which were, for example, mentioned in Chapter 2, but it 
would be worthwhile to picture prospects for such kind of initiative. The section 
will also cover the potentially one of the most promising for Russian LNG industry 
projects, Novatek, Russia's largest independent natural gas producer [18], plans to 
create a sea transhipment terminal in the bay of Bechevinsky. 
In 2019 Russia became the largest exporter of oil to China outside the circle 
of OPEC countries. [Appendix 13] Russia managed to occupy a 15% stake in 
Chinese oil imports, the report said. Based on EIA data, it can be concluded that 
total oil supplies from Russia to China last year amounted to about 584 million 
barrels (almost 80.2 million tons). Earlier, the FCS of the Russian Federation 
reported that the physical volume of Russian oil exports to all countries in 2019 
increased by 2.7% - up to 267.46 million tons compared to 2018. Thus, taking into 
account the EIA data, supplies to China accounted for almost 30% of Russian oil 
exports in 2019. 
In November 2019, Russian Minister of Energy Alexander Novak noted that 
Russia occupies a leading position in the export of crude oil to the PRC, increasing 
its supply by 27.4% in 2018, and is also a leader in the export of electricity. In his 




On the Chinese gas market, however, Russian companies are comparably 
new. The Power of Siberia gas pipeline from Russia to China was launched on 
December 2 of last year. Its length is about three thousand kilometers. This is the 
first gas pipeline from Russia to the Asia-Pacific countries. This year it is planned 
to deliver to China, at least five billion cubic meters of gas, in 2021 - 10 billion, in 
2022 - 15. The maximum capacity that the pipeline should reach is 38 billion cubic 
meters of gas per year. The company expects to achieve such pumping volumes in 
2025. Further expansion of pipeline capacities to 60 billion cubic meters per year is 
also envisaged.  
Nevertheless, according to research of Russian news agency, there are big 
problems that can threaten the success of the whole Power of Siberia project. In an 
investigation, Lenta.ru writes about this with reference to the company's internal 
documents: an appeal to Gazprom’s top management and a report by the gas giant, 
which was prepared by Gazprom dobycha Noyabrsk, Gazprom’s subsidiary 
responsible for development of the Chayandinsky oil and gas condensate field.[48] 
“Documents indicate numerous violations in the development of the field, 
connivance of the management of Gazprom and Gazprom Dobycha Noyabrsk, 
patronage and intentional suppression of the scale of problems with the 
development of the field, which serves as the resource base of the Power of 
Siberia. And because of problems on which the entire project runs the risk of being 
in jeopardy,” the publication said. According to Lenta.ru estimates, Gazprom and 
its subsidiaries spent about 982 million rubles on geological exploration of the 
Chayandinskoye field located in the untouched part of Siberia. For this, 20 
government procurements were carried out, information about which was closed. 
At the same time, the press service of Gazprom assured that the company does not 
conduct secret purchases.[48] 
The publication links the concealment of information on tenders from public 
access with the internal report of Gazprom’s leading engineers working at the 
Chayandinskoye field. The report said that the reserves of the field are not enough 
for the planned filling of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, Lenta.ru claims. 
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As journalists say, “Since 2014, according to official data, Chayanda’s 
reserves have already been revised in favor of a decrease: from 1.45 trillion cubic 
meters of gas to 1.2 trillion, and the number of planned wells has fallen from 335 
to about 278 units.”[48] 
The Gazprom press service, in response to allegations of a reduction in 
wells, said that this information was false and the plan still cost 335 wells. 
According to Andrei Filippov, deputy head of the 307th department (responsible 
for all production at the company), the main problem of the field was that it was 
not ready for development due to the fact that it was in the exploration stage. The 
decision to start work was made in a narrow circle of top managers of the natural 
gas monopoly. But at that time, the leadership did not have the exact data of 
geological exploration on hand in order to correctly assess the situation. “Partly, 
Miller put pressure on those attending that meeting. One of the most expensive top 
managers in Russia insisted that if Russia doesn’t enter the growing Chinese 
market, then “the Americans will go there with their liquefied natural gas (LNG),” 
notes Lenta.ru. 
According to Filippov, Similar problems are noted at the other resource 
point of the Power of Siberia - Kovykta field. There, according to the interlocutors 
of the publication, the estimated reserves were not confirmed. The publication, 
referring to the company's internal documents, claims that Andrei Filippov, deputy 
head of Gazprom’s 307 department, and Dmitry Izosimov, chief geologist at 
Gazprom dobycha Noyabrsk, tried to deceive the state and Gazprom’s leadership 
in order to conceal the extent of the problems associated with the development of 
the Chayandinskoye field. This is evidenced by the company’s internal documents, 
copies of which are available to Lenta.ru. [48] 
The total losses of the state-owned company Gazprom due to difficulties in 
developing the Chayandinskoye field may amount to more than 1.5 trillion rubles. 
This amount includes costs from 34 “dry” (not confirmed) wells, which are 
estimated at about 500 billion rubles lost profits for the entire duration of the 
Russian-Chinese contract. [48] 
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Now at the very start of Russia's entry into the Asia-Pacific gas market, it is 
more important than ever to meet the standards and supplies volumes specified in 
the contract. The disruption of the Power of Siberia project can lead to the collapse 
of the adjacent Power of Siberia 2 project. Then, conversations about the 
reorientation of the Russian gas market from Europe to Asia will not begin soon. 
Violations of contractual obligations threaten the loss of confidence in the 
energy sector of Russia by the Asian partners. The Gazpromneft press service said 
that the investigation provided false information and that the project is proceeding 
at its intended course. 
In addition to economic losses, political losses are possible. The general 
credibility and respect can be questioned. Russia cannot afford such kind fail as it 
will only harden one of the obstacles on the way of Greater Eurasia discussed in 
the First Chapter of the paper – lack of capabilities. It also will stay away the 
partners from Greater Eurasian partnership initiative in the field of one of the most 
important issues in the world – energy security. Potential influence of this project 
on the feasibility of Greater Eurasian concept is colossal. 
In the face of such crisis, parallel projects in the region have also their own 
problems. Trans-Korean pipeline, which is only on paper, as mentioned in the 
second chapter, faces political problem of North Korea, but holds a great 
opportunity for Russian gas companies. South Korea is dependent on imports of 
energy resources. About 98% of internal fuel consumption is supplied by third 
parties. Republic Korea wants Russian prices for gas; Russia wants to diversify 
consumers in the region. It could be potentially “win-win” cooperation. Moscow 
would strengthen its presence in the Asia-Pacific; Korea would satisfy its internal 
consumption demand at a lower price, becoming a large customer for Russian gas 
in Asia. 
On 5 September 2019 Novatek and the Japanese company Saibu Gas Co., 
Ltd. signed the basic terms of the agreement. In accordance with the signed 
Agreement, the parties plan to create a joint venture, the tasks of which will be the 
sale of LNG and natural gas to end consumers, the development of bunkering and 
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electricity generating capacities on natural gas in Japan and the countries of the 
Asian region, as well as the construction and operation of a new LNG storage tank 
in the territory Hibiki LNG terminal. “We have taken one more step in 
implementing our strategy of entering the market of end consumers of key gas 
importing countries, among which Japan is one of the largest markets,” said 
Leonid Mikhelson, Chairman of the Board of Novatek. “The creation of a joint 
venture will allow us to increase supply flexibility and create additional 
opportunities for the implementation of LNG in this region.” In summer 2019 the 
first batch of liquefied natural gas produced at the Yamal LNG plant was unloaded 
at the terminal of the port of Tobata. “The start of LNG shipments to the Japanese 
market is a very important event for our company,” said Leonid Mikhelson, 
chairman of the board of Novatek, Russia's largest natural gas company. “Japan 
today represents a very significant market for liquefied natural gas and one of the 
priority areas of marketing Novatek’s strategy: Further development of the supply 
chain using the Northern Sea Route and the transhipment terminal in Kamchatka 
will help expand LNG supplies to Japan and strengthen trade and economic ties 
between our countries.” [51] 
After, another important event occurred in Osaka. Novatek, a consortium of 
Mitsui & Co, and the Japan National Oil, Gas, and Metals Corporation JOGMEC 
signed a sales agreement for a 10 percent stake in the Arctic LNG 2 project. Arctic 
LNG 2 is another new ambitious Russian project for the production of liquefied 
natural gas in the Arctic along with the Yamal LNG project, which is already 
operating. It provides for the construction of three phases for the production of 
liquefied natural gas with a capacity of 6.6 million tons per year in each. The 
project is being implemented on the basis of the richest Morning Field on the 
Yamal Peninsula. As of December 31, 2018, the proven and probable reserves of 
this field according to PRMS standards amounted to 1,138 billion cubic meters of 
natural gas and 57 million tons of liquid hydrocarbons. According to the Russian 
classification, the field’s reserves amounted to 1978 billion cubic meters of natural 
gas and 105 million tons of liquid hydrocarbons. The LNG terminal in the port of 
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Tobata where the first shipment of gas from the Russian Arctic arrived is located 
almost next to another Japanese LNG terminal – Hibiki, which is strategically very 
important for Russian producers of natural gas. At the end of 2018, the Russian 
company and the Japanese Saibu Gas signed a memorandum of understanding 
regarding the optimization of LNG supplies to the countries of the Asia-Pacific 
region through the use of the capacity of the Hibiki LNG terminal. [52] 
This terminal is even larger than the terminal in the port of Tobata - its 
capacity is 7.5 million tons per year. It will just supplement the Novatek 
transhipment terminal in Kamchatka. The company plans to build an offshore LNG 
transhipment complex in Bechevinsky Bay, where LNG from Arc7 ice-class gas 
tankers will be loaded onto lower-class tankers. This will allow the Russian 
company to optimize the movement routes of high-class gas tankers, using them 
only on the Northern Sea Route. And the transhipment terminal in Kamchatka and 
the Japanese Hibiki reception terminal will create a logistically very convenient 
route for delivering liquefied natural gas to the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. 
The entrance to Japanese market means a lot in the frame of Greater Eurasia. 
Strengthening ties with the ally of geopolitical opponent, the US, and widening 
LNG export opportunities in Japan can help to reorient Russian export of LNG 
from traditional markets and make it less dependable on revenues from export to 
Europe. 
Conclusion to the third chapter 
Overall projects of Russian gas and oil companies hold great influence over 
the Greater Eurasia concept. In Europe there is a tendency to refute sanctions 
imposed by US as energy security and supply is much more important when the 
national industries and new environmental policies are at stake. Moreover, work on 
projects that will redirect gas supplies from transit countries directly to the 
consumers allow to geopolitically choose the allies not relying on inconsistent in 
their policies transit countries. 
Asian, especially Chinese, projects’ results will probably show if it is even 
possible to create cooperative Greater Eurasia and not just become the “bones” 
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under The Belt and Road initiative. New strategic partners in Asia-Pacific region 
will allow diversifying the cooperation circle and not being exclusively Chinese 
partner in the field of energy security in Asia but to widen and develop new routes 
of supplies. Potentially these projects can help Russia to uphold a position of not 
just energy resources supplier but energy security supplier within the forming 





In the first chapter of the research the Greater Eurasia concept was “put on 
the bench”. This chapter described what overall is Greater Eurasia, current state of 
affairs, agenda that is in front of the integration and obstacles and barriers on the 
way of implementation. Main conclusions of the chapter: 
1. Greater Eurasia is at the same time regional, extra-regional and global 
project. It holds grand ambitions on all levels of cooperation: post-Soviet space as 
regional component; Asia-Pacific, South Asia and Europe as extra-regional 
component; new world order characteristics as global component. 
2. There are numerous purposes that Greater Eurasia can serve: economic – 
Russia has ambition to diversify its markets with countries of Asia-Pacific and 
South Asia regions, building mutually beneficial cooperation; yet another 
important side of question is to build a new security frame within region; 
ideological confrontation to failing Liberal world order. 
3. Barriers and obstacles on the way of such grandiose integration project are 
as large. The difference in the agendas of key players, lack of capacities and 
unclear future fate of the project in terms of political will sophisticate the 
implementation of the Greater Eurasia idea. 
The second chapter highlighted the energy security issue within Greater 
Eurasia and distinguished the main projects of oil and gas companies on both 
European and Asian markets. Main conclusions of the chapter: 
1. Energy security is a transforming construct that stand as an issue in almost 
every county in the world. 
2. There are certain standards which apply to the “healthy” energy security 
system: it is designed to ensure the reliability of energy supplies in the common 
interests of the global economy, and each country, and consumers, and energy 
producers. Moreover, this system should be transparent, based on international law 
and a responsible policy regarding the supply and demand of energy resources. 
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3. The projects of Russian oil and gas companies have numerous instances 
both on Asian and European side. They hold great ambitions of diversifying 
Russian market making Russia Eurasian player.  
The effects which projects can potentially bring in the Greater Eurasia 
concept were analyzed in the third chapter of this paper. The main conclusions of 
the chapter: 
1.  The influence which Russia holds on the European mostly gas market can 
change the current views of Europeans, especially with the US trade war 
background. Strengthening the cooperation via supplies and new projects can 
contribute to widening of the frame of Greater Eurasia. 
 2. The Asian market is new to Russian companies. On the success of current 
projects can and will be built the future cooperation.  
3. At stake is one of the more sensitive topics for every country – energy 
security. Successful projects can give Russia an opportunity to become energy 
security supplier within Eurasia. 
All the objectives set in the introduction were completed in the current 
research. The analysis of the Greater Eurasia concept has shown that the idea is far 
from being fully built up. It is the reason why the field of Eurasian studies has to 
be widened and new scholars have to be invited with the fresh vision of potential 
construct of such a grandiose integration project. The research also revealed the 
difficulties on the way which are yet to be solved on the way to Greater Eurasian 
cooperation. The paper successfully distinguished the Russian oil and projects-
headliners in the region. The analysis of possibility of impact of such projects on 
Greater Eurasia feasibility has shown that there are serious effects on the 
integration project, both in case of success and fail.  
The results of the research provided in this paper can be applied to the future 
PhD thesis widening the topic with thorough economic analysis with the new data 
of the future years; especially the on the Asian market, as of now there is no 
widespread statistics on economic effects of Russian gas supplies to China. The 
research    can also be helpful for the Eurasian studies scholars as the start point of 
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the new research on Russian gas and oil projects and energy security of Eurasia. 
The work helps to diversify the monotone background of Greater Eurasia studies. 
Russian companies’ oil and gas projects serve not only economic purpose 
but also political, promoting the interests of Russia in tight cooperation and 
establishing a new integration construct Greater Eurasia. The projects are no one-
sided. They build new interdependency, increasing the list of probable partners that 
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